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Chapter 1
Evolutionary Agent-Based
Economics: Introduction
In the last few years, scientists working in the fields of economics and social
science have abandoned the assumption of perfect rationality. Theories of
(economic) behavior and decision making often assume that decision mak-
ers have all the capabilities and information needed to make an optimal
decision, that is that they exhibit perfect rationality. Furthermore, in such
theories it is often assumed that agents (decision makers) are homogeneous
(i.e., have similar characteristics and preferences) and that interaction is
anonymous and global. Theoretical outcomes predicted by these theories
often differ from outcomes observed in the real world. However, less restric-
tive and more realistic assumptions regarding agent behavior often lead to
analytically untractable models. Recent advances in computer science have
however made it possible to simulate artificial societies and thus study eco-
nomic models by running computer simulations. This new field of study is
called Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE).
ACE combines elements and views from economics, social sciences and
computer science to study such artificial societies. The decision makers
in these societies are called agents. Also, ACE allows us to study large
systems of such interacting economic agents from the bottom up. Further-
more, we can relax some of the assumptions of traditional economics. More
specifically, we can consider agents that are so-called boundedly rational as
opposed to perfectly rational and that are heterogeneous in their behavior,
that is agents may differ in their decision making capabilities and strate-
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gies. Furthermore, this approach allows us to explicitly take the role of
interaction into account. ACE holds the view that individual actions, and
in turn aggregate outcomes, are in a large part determined by the inter-
action between agents (Tesfatsion 2001). This stands in contrast with the
market view of the economy where buyers and sellers are anonymous and
the structure of the interaction is typically considered less important. This
thesis deals with the behavior of boundedly rational, heterogeneous agents
as described above. More specifically, we look at boundedly rational agents
that have to adapt their behavior and strategies both in response to changes
in the environment and to changes in the behavior of other agents.
We use an evolutionary algorithm approach to model the learning and
search behavior of economic agents. Evolutionary algorithms are based on
the principle of “survival of the fittest” from nature. Evolutionary algo-
rithms were first developed by Holland (1975) and he identified economics
as an application field for evolutionary algorithms. However, the first evolu-
tionary algorithm applications to economics were in the operations research
domain where evolutionary algorithms were used to solve specific prob-
lems. Only recently have researchers begun to study and refine economic
theories and the relation between micro-level behavior and macro-level out-
comes through agent-based simulation. The evolutionary approach allows
us to study the process as well as the possible equilibrium outcomes of the
economic systems under investigation. An example of this approach that
we study in this thesis are the new market structures that arise through
electronic commerce and trading over the Internet. We use Evolutionary
Agent-Based Computational Economics models (ACE models using evolu-
tionary algorithms) to study, for example, the emergent behavior and the
new market structures that arise, when we consider the trade and social
networks between agents in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
As described above, Evolutionary Agent-Based Computational Economics
differs from traditional economics in two important aspects. Agents are
boundedly rational instead of perfectly rational and interaction is not global
and anonymous. These two factors form the basis of this thesis and are dis-
cussed in more detail below. Section 1.1 discusses heterogeneous, boundedly
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rational agents while Section 1.2 is concerned with interaction structure.
Section 1.3 gives an overview of the relevant concepts of evolutionary algo-
rithms. Finally, Section 1.4 provides the outline for the remainder of this
thesis and Section 1.5 gives an overview of previously published parts of
this thesis.
1.1 Heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents
This thesis is concerned with heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents. In
this section we will describe the field of agent-based computational eco-
nomics that studies systems of such interacting agents. Agent-based com-
putational economics combines elements from computer science and eco-
nomics. First, we will give a brief overview of the concept of agent as it is
used in those disciplines and relate this to our study. Then we will give a
more detailed description of agent-based economics. Finally we will address
the issue of bounded rationality in more detail.
1.1.1 Agents in economics
In economics we encounter ‘agents’ in two different contexts. First, we
discuss the notion of the so-called representative agent. A representative
agent is an agent that has the characteristics that best represent the average
economic actor in the model. Representative agent models then study the
behavior of a whole population of such agents. Models that make use of
a representative agent, are thus essentially homogeneous. ACE is both a
useful and necessary addition to representative agent models since it allows
us to design and study heterogeneous agent models.
Second, economic agency theory—see Eisenhardt (1989) for an overview—
describes and investigates the agency relationship, in which one party (the
principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work.
The so-called principal-agent problem arises when the agent has an informa-
tional advantage over the principal and has different interests and a different
attitude towards risk than the principal. Agency theory investigates how to
get the agent to act in the best interests of the principal. Eisenhardt (1989)
states that: “In general, agency theory is thus concerned with relationships
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between a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative behavior,
but have differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk”. Agency the-
ory attempts to ensure this cooperative behavior by formulating a contract
between the principal and the agent. Principal-agent theory can be ap-
plied to employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier and other agency
relationships.
1.1.2 Agents in computer science
The following definition for software agent as can be found in Weiss (1999)
and Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) is often used in computer science:
An agent is a computer system that is situated in some environ-
ment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this environ-
ment in order to meet its design goals.
Software agent research was first motivated by the wish to design pieces
of software that can perform some task for their owner as would a human
agent, i.e., a travel agent or stockbroker (Maes 1994). In the case of software
agents, the principal from economic agency theory (see Section 1.1.1) is usu-
ally referred to as the owner or user of the agent. Autonomy is central to the
notion of agency in computer science and refers to the property that agents
are able to act without the intervention of humans or other systems: they
have control both over their own internal state and their behavior. The de-
gree of autonomy the agent has depends on whether it is able (and allowed)
to adequately represent the user and how competent it is in autonomously
performing the delegated tasks. The level of intelligence the agent exhibits is
determined by its reasoning and learning capabilities and its ability to adapt
to his environment (Turban and Aronson 1998, Gilbert and Janca 1997).
As technology progresses, the boundaries between ordinary programs and
software agents and between “dumb” and intelligent agents will continually
shift. Therefore, there exists no commonly accepted definition of intelligent
software agent. Several authors have however suggested characteristics that
intelligent agents should exhibit, see for instance (Bradshaw 1997).
Multi-agent systems (Faratin et al. 2003, Chiarella et al. 2003, Fatima et
al. 2003, Hu and Wellman 2003, Walsh and Wellman 2003, Weiss 1999) are
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systems where a group of software agents work together to solve a number
of tasks.
1.1.3 Agent-Based Computational Economics
In agent-based computational economics, we define an agent as an individual
actor that has some (limited) reasoning and decision-making capabilities.
This is the definition we will use in the remainder of this thesis. Agent-based
computational economics (ACE) is the research field that is concerned with
systems of such interacting agents. Tesfatsion (2001) defines ACE as:
The computational study of economies modeled as evolving systems
of autonomous interacting agents.
ACE investigates how the interactions between individuals can give rise
to certain economic or social phenomena that are so far unexplained by
traditional economics. An ACE simulation starts with a population of
agents, some behavioral rules for these agents, a definition of the possi-
ble interactions between the agents and some external influences. During
the simulation agents try to achieve their goals by adapting to other agents
and the changing environment. Thus the relationship between micro-level
behavior, that is the behavior of the individual agents, and macro-level
outcomes, that is the global patterns that emerge through all those indi-
vidual interactions, can be studied. ACE simulation can give us insights in
topics such as equilibrium selection (i.e., which rest-points are most likely
for the system of agents when theory predicts multiple possibilities), new
sources of dynamics, analysis of ‘regime changes’ (sudden changes in aggre-
gate behavior), retreating from perfect rationality as well as new optimiza-
tion and estimation models (Simon 1984, Sargent 1993, Albin 1998, Kalai
and Lehrer 1993, NachBar 1997).
The notion of agent in ACE is thus broader than in economic agency
theory. While principal-agent problems are interesting and can be studied
using ACE, agents in ACE can represent many other types of economic
actors. More specifically, ACE can also be used to study agent systems
where agents display competitive instead of cooperative behavior. Further-
more, ACE allows us to study systems where many agents interact while
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principal-agent theory is mostly concerned with the relationship between
two cooperating agents. The notion of agent in ACE also differs from that
of software agent described above. Software agents do not necessarily model
economic behavior as in ACE. Furthermore, intelligent software agents are
often specialists that excel at a particular task but do not necessarily display
learning or adaptive behavior as in ACE. While multi-agent systems can also
be used to model economic systems, the majority of multi-agent systems
research focuses on solving a particular problem or developing intelligent
agents that do not necessarily model the behavior of economic agents. Fur-
thermore, the majority of multi-agents systems research is concerned with
cooperative agent systems while ACE also focuses on competitive behavior.
1.1.4 Bounded Rationality
Perfectly rational agents have all the decision-making capabilities and the
information needed to make an optimal decision. Perfect rationality is as-
sumed in many economic and game theoretic models. Motivated by the
fact that decision makers often have to deal with limited time, limited re-
sources and incomplete information, Simon (1984) introduced the notion of
bounded rationality. Bounded rationality describes the fact that decision
makers often do not have the computational capabilities and the informa-
tion needed to make a perfectly rational decision. Bounded rationality thus
addresses the fact that economic agents usually do not exhibit perfect ratio-
nality as assumed in most economic models, but rather that their rationality
is bounded. Bounded rationality with respect to computational capabilities
means that agents do not have the resources (for example time, money,
memory or computing facilities) to consider all possible courses of action
and remember the effects of past behavior. Bounded rationality with respect
to available information covers a wide range of restrictions on the behavior
of the agents. First, agents may not have perfect information about their
environment but rather acquire information through interaction with the
environment. Furthermore, the environment may change over time due to
agent actions or external influences. Second, agents may not know all there
is to know about the other agents in the environment, and third, agents
may not be able to correctly observe the decisions made by other agents.
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Replacing the assumption of perfectly rational agents by that of bound-
edly rational agents allows us to build more realistic models of agent decision
making processes. Several authors have addressed the issue of bounded ra-
tionality in economic models (Sargent 1993, Albin 1998, Kalai and Lehrer
1993, NachBar 1997). It is interesting to note that sometimes bound-
edly rational agents are able to arrive at economic outcomes that are pre-
ferred (in terms of e.g., payoff to the agents) over the theoretical out-
come (Arthur 1993). This suggests that the concept of bounded rationality
can play a role in explaining the discrepancies between theoretical outcomes
and the observed reality.
Different ways of dealing with bounded rationality can be observed in
real economic agents and have also been investigated using agent-based
economics. An example of such boundedly rational agents in ACE that
are inspired by real-world observations are agents that use heuristic rules
or simple rules of thumb to make their decisions. Other mechanisms such
as imitation, the use of tags, trust, loyalty and reputation play a large
role in real markets and have been incorporated in ACE models. All these
mechanisms help to compensate for the lack of (correct) information in
boundedly rational decision processes and help agents to make decisions
based on limited information. In this thesis several of these mechanism
are studied. Chapter 2, for example, discusses several types of bounded
rationality and their effects on economic outcomes and Chapter 3 addresses
the use of tags as a means to guide the interaction between agents.
1.2 The role of interaction in ACE
In agent-based economics, interaction plays an important role. In tradi-
tional economics, interaction is anonymous and global, that is, agents can-
not choose and do not have preferences about whom they have interaction
with and furthermore, they are equally likely to interact with all other
agents. In the real world interaction is often not anonymous, agents have
repeated encounters with other agents and mechanisms like for example
reputation and trust may lead to a preference for one agent over the other.
Furthermore, agents may display different (types of) behavior dependent
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on whom they interact with, this is called conditional interaction. Spatial
and time restrictions often cause interaction not to be global. But even in
the current times of instant trade over the internet, the trade partners of
an agent are restricted by the number of partners he knows about, that is
the interaction structure of the agents depends on their social network.
The importance of considering the effects of interaction between agents is
illustrated in the famous work by Schelling (1978) on segregation. Schelling
considered a grid with two types of agents. The agents only interact with
their eight immediate neighbors. An agent decides to move to a preferred
spot on the grid if less than 37.5 percent of its neighbors are of the same
type as itself. The simulation was initialized with a fully mixed grid (a
checkerboard pattern) and then started by a small perturbation of this
pattern. Schelling found that even such a slight preference for one’s neighbor
to be of the same type as himself would lead to complete segregation on
the grid within a few iterations, even though initially the grid was mixed.
This work is an example of a strong emerging phenomenon based upon
social interaction and Schelling’s work is considered to be one of the first
examples of ACE.
In this thesis we examine how outcomes change if the assumptions of
global and anonymous interaction are relaxed. Chapter 3 treats the situa-
tion where interaction is not anonymous. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 discuss
the case where interaction is not global but restricted by the social network
of the economic agents. Below we will give a short introduction to social
networks as they are used in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
1.2.1 Social Networks
A social network is a set of people or groups of people with some pattern of
contacts or interactions between them (Scott 2000, Wasserman and Faust
1994). A social network can be represented by a graph where the nodes are
agents and the edges are the connections or links between the agents. These
connections signify that there is a relationship between two agents and that
they can for example trade or exchange information with each other. Both
social networks with undirected and directed edges have been studied in the
literature (Bala and Goyal 2000, Kranton and Minehart 2001).
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Below, we discuss some relevant terms and concepts from the literature
on networks. Dense networks are networks that contain many links, the
network where each agent has a direct link to all other agents is called the
complete, or fully-connected network. The empty network is the network
where there are no links at all between the agents, while a network with only
a few links is called a sparse network. A path through a graph is a traversal
of consecutive vertices along a sequence of edges. When there exists a path
in the network between any two agents in the network, the network is said
to be connected and information from one agent can spread over the links
to all other agents in the network. This is not possible in a disconnected
network. Disconnected networks can consist of multiple connected subnet-
works (components) or of one connected subnetwork (component) and a
few isolated agents. Figure 1.1 gives examples of the different types of net-
works. Network A in Figure 1.1 thus consists of twelve components, network
B consists of one component and finally, network C has two components.
A: Empty Network B: Fully Connected Network C: Disconnected Network
Figure 1.1: Different network topologies: A: Empty, B: Fully-connected network and C:
disconnected network.
The degree of a node in the network describes the number of neighbors of
a given node (agent) in the network. If all nodes have an equal number
of links, then the network is called a regular network, and this number is
referred to as the degree of the network. Two properties of networks are
especially important when we consider the spread of information over a net-
work. First, the average path length of a network is a measure for how may
steps it takes on average to go from one random node to a random second
node. Note that this path length may be infinitely long for disconnected
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networks. In general, (connected) regular graphs have long path lengths
while (connected) random graphs are characterized by short path lengths.
Second, the clustering coefficient of a network describes how ‘clustered’
a network is. If a network exhibits a high level of clustering, there is an
increased probability that the neighbors of a particular node are also direct
neighbors of each other (compared to random networks). Clustering, or
network transitivity as it is sometimes called, thus describes the fact that
in many networks it is found that if node A is connected to node B and
node B to node C, then there is a high probability that node A will also be
connected to node C. One measure that can be used to make the level of
clustering in a network more explicit is the clustering coefficient C. C is the
probability that two nodes that are network neighbors of the same other
node will themselves be neighbors and can be defined as follows:
C =
[
3 x number of triangles in the network
number of connected triples of nodes
]
Figure 1.2 depicts three types of networks which are of special interest: The
k-regular network is a network where all agents have exactly k neighbors.
In this thesis we restrict ourselves to regular networks that are modeled
as a (one dimensional) ring lattice where each agent is connected to its k
nearest neighbors by undirected edges. Apart from regular networks we also
consider the random networks, small world networks and networks formed
by preferential attachment. In a random network the links between agents
are constructed randomly. Small world networks and networks formed by
preferential attachment are inspired by observations made on real world
networks, as follows.
As originally defined in Watts and Strogatz (1998), small world networks are
obtained from regular lattices (in this case one dimensional ‘ring’ networks)
by rewiring a few randomly chosen edges. In another version (Newman
and Watts 1999), they are graphs whose vertices are connected together
in a regular lattice, with the addiction of a small number of connections
bridging randomly chosen vertices. In this thesis we restrict ourselves to
Watts-Strogatz small world networks, i.e, small world networks that can
be disconnected. Small world networks are thought to be a good model
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A: Regular Network B: Small World Network C: Random Network
Figure 1.2: Different network topologies: A regular network, a small world network and a
random network.
for many real world networks (Watts and Strogatz 1998). The small world
effect, is the observation that most pairs of nodes in most networks seem to
be connected by a short path through the network. The small world effect
has obvious implications for the dynamics of processes taking place on such
networks. For example, the small world effect implies that the spread of
information across a network will be fast on most real-world networks. In
recent years the term small world effect has taken on a more precise meaning:
networks are said to show the small world effect if the value of the average
path length scales logarithmically or slower with network size for fixed mean
degree. Small world networks are thought to be a good approximation of
many real world networks and they are special because they exhibit both
short path lengths and high clustering. Small-world graphs show a higher
level of clustering than random graphs, while preserving short average path
lengths. Their pattern is not as ordered as in a regular lattice, but they
still exhibit high clustering.
In addition to the research describing properties of real world networks
researchers have recently begun to investigate how these properties have
evolved. In these models, the networks typically grow by the gradual ad-
dition of vertices and edges in some manner intended to reflect growth
processes that lead to characteristic structural features of the network. A
common property of many large networks is that the node connectivities
follow a scale-free power-law distribution. This feature was found to be a
consequence of two generic mechanisms: (i) networks expand continuously
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by the addition of new nodes and (ii) new nodes attach preferentially to sites
that are already well connected. This phenomenon is called preferential
attachment as first described by Baraba´si and Albert (1999).
A related feature of real world social networks is assortative mixing or
homophily. In most kinds of social networks there are at least a few different
types of nodes or agents, and the probability of connection between agents
often depends on types. That is, agents are more likely to interact with other
agents that are similar to them in some respect, this is called assortative
mixing. Assortative mixing thus describes processes where agents prefer
to link up with similar agents instead of with well-connected agents as with
preferential attachment.
The topology of the network can have great influence on the interaction
between agents as well as on the outcome of the interaction. In Chapter 5
and Chapter 6 we study social networks and the economic outcomes that
arise through interaction over such networks. More specifically, in Chapter 5
we study a network between consumers, producers and intermediaries where
links represent opportunities to buy a product. Chapter 6 is concerned
with the influence of the topology of the social network on the spread of
information over the network.
1.3 Evolutionary algorithms
An evolutionary algorithm is a biologically inspired technique that uses
the concept of survival of the fittest to evolve solutions to a particular
problem and were first described by Holland (1975). For an overview
of evolutionary algorithms see Mitchell (1996). The class of evolutionary
algorithms consists of different techniques such as genetic programming,
evolution strategies and genetic algorithms. In this thesis we restrict our
attention to the genetic algorithms (GA). A typical GA can be described
as follows (Mitchell 1996), see also Figure 1.3.
First, a population of randomly initialized strategies is generated. This is
the population of chromosomes or genotypes. The behavior that is encoded
in these chromosomes, that is, the behavior exhibited by an agent using that
particular strategy can be seen as the phenotype. In this thesis we restrict
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Population
Population
Selection
Population
Mutation
Recombination,
Parent
Offspring
Repeat
Initialize
Figure 1.3: Outline of a typical Genetic Algorithm.
ourselves to binary encoded chromosomes (that is, the chromosome consists
of zeros and ones). This population of chromosomes is subsequently changed
and improved in a number of generations by means of selection, recombi-
nation (crossover), and mutation. Selection chooses the better strategies
(with higher accumulated payoffs) that will serve as parents for the next
generation of strategies. This corresponds to the concept of “survival of the
fittest” in nature. Offspring is then formed by pairwise recombination of
the parents. Finally, the offspring strategies are slightly changed, with a
small probability and the new population replaces the old one. Recombina-
tion is usually regarded as information exchange between strategies, while
mutation can be seen as error or innovation. Figure 1.4 gives an example
of the mutation operator. Usually the chance of mutation is specified by
the mutation rate per bit, that is each bit on the chromosome has a small
chance of being mutated. Although the settings for the mutation rate de-
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pend on the particular problem that is studied, a general guideline (Ba¨ck
et al. 1997b) is that the mutation rate per bit can be taken as 1/(length of
the chromosome).
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1Mutation Offspring:Parent: 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
Figure 1.4: Example of mutation.
The recombination operator is also called crossover operator. The three
most common crossover operators are one-point crossover, two-point crossover
and uniform crossover. With one-point crossover a randomly selected point
of the chromosome is chosen as the crossover point. This crossover point
divides the parent chromosomes into two parts. The two offspring chromo-
somes are then created by recombining the individual parts of the parent
chromosomes, as demonstrated in Figure 1.5. Two-point crossover works
essentially the same, except that two crossover points are selected. Finally,
with uniform crossover, for each bit-position it is randomly decided whether
the first offspring inherits the bit value of the first or the second parent. The
second offspring then inherits the bit value of the other parent.
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Parent 1:
Parent 2:
Crossover Offspring 1:Offspring 2:
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Crossover point
Figure 1.5: Example of one-point crossover.
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1.3.1 Evolutionary algorithms for modeling Agent Behavior
Originally, evolutionary algorithms were designed for and used in optimiza-
tion problems. Until recently, most applications of evolutionary computa-
tion to economics were in optimization and operations research, see Bi-
ethahn and (Eds.) (1995) for examples. Fudenberg and Levine (1998a)
suggested that techniques from the field of artificial intelligence should be
used to design more accurate models of boundedly rational learning.
Since the pioneering work by Axelrod (1984) and Miller (1986), evolution-
ary algorithms are increasingly used in economics, see for example (Arifovic
1994, Arifovic 1996, Arifovic 1998, Arifovic and Eaton 1995, Chen and
Yeh 1997, Bullard 1999) . More specifically, in this type of research, evolu-
tionary algorithms are used to model the behavior and interaction of het-
erogeneous boundedly rational agents. The aim of such evolutionary sim-
ulations is not to develop isolated solutions to a single problem instance
(as in optimization) but rather to gain insight in the dynamics and char-
acteristics of a particular model. Evolutionary simulation can thus be ap-
plied to economic problems that are analytically untractable. Within these
fields, however, evolutionary algorithms (EAs) can be used for different pur-
poses. One application of evolutionary algorithms considers the evolution
of strategies. EAs are then used to evolve good strategies that agents in
an (economic) game setting can use, see for example the work of Axelrod
(1984) and Beaufills et al. (1996) on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Other researchers use EAs as a model for human learning and use data
from experiments with human subjects to calibrate the EA. Examples are
the work of Marks (1998), Dawid (1999) and Arifovic (1994). Another topic
that is often considered in ACE research is how differences in the learning
mechanism may influence the outcome of the system. The work of Marks
(1992) and Vriend (2000) on oligopoly markets provide examples of this
strand of literature.
In these evolutionary simulations, the genetic population is regarded as
a pool of strategies that can be used by the learning agents. Agents then
interact with each other (through a market or game) or with the environ-
ment and they obtain a payoff. This payoff determines the fitness of the
strategy that was used by the agent and strategies are updated by the
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genetic algorithm. Economic evolutionary simulations thus differ from evo-
lutionary optimization in the sense that there is no global absolute fitness
function, but fitness is determined through interaction. Most evolutionary
simulations are based either on individual learning (e.g., Classifier Systems)
where agents learn based on their own previous experience or on popula-
tion learning, where agents learn based on the experiences of others. Which
type of learning is more suitable to model a specific problem depends on
the economic model that is used. In a population learning model agents can
adapt parts of the strategies of other agents through recombination which
means that (parts of) strategies are visible to other agents. Whether this
is realistic depends on the economic problem that is studied since economic
agents (firms, bargaining individuals) often make great efforts to hide their
strategies from their competitors.
Furthermore, the use of evolutionary algorithms also presents some prob-
lems for the modeler in terms of interpretation and model settings. Tech-
nical parameter settings are often chosen from an economic perspective
neglecting known issues and guidelines from computer science (Ba¨ck et
al. 1997b, Jong 1975, Grefenstette 1986, Ba¨ck et al. 1997a). Several au-
thors have addressed the issue of interpretation of evolutionary algorithms
in economics (Edmonds 2001, Chattoe 1998, Vriend 2000, Klos 1999). In ad-
dition, attempts were made to unify the theories of natural selection and eco-
nomics (Knudsen 2002, Hodgson 2002, Weibull 2002, Alchian 1950, Nelson
and Winter 1982, Blume and Easley 1993). Also, several papers appeared
that unify simple genetic algorithms and economic theory (Arifovic forth-
coming, Riechmann 2001a, Dawid 1999). In Chapter 2 we discuss these
modeling and interpretation issues in more detail.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
As described above, Evolutionary Agent-Based Computational Economics
differs from traditional economics in two important aspects. Agents are
boundedly rational instead of perfectly rational and interaction is not global
and not anonymous. These two factors form the basis of this thesis. In
subsequent chapters we aim to include these aspects in our models. First
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we investigate the behavior of boundedly rational agents and the effects
of (different types of) interaction in existing economic models, and then
we address new models concerning internet markets and information goods.
Chapter 2 is a methodological chapter addressing the design and implemen-
tation of evolutionary agent-based economic simulations using an economic
textbook example, the Cournot game. In the subsequent chapters the in-
sights provided in Chapter 2 function as a basis for designing robust and
valid simulations. In Chapter 3, we study the behavior of different types of
boundedly rational agents. Again we study the Cournot model since this
allows us to relate our results to theoretical outcomes. In Chapter 4 we con-
sider the effects of selective interaction on agent-behaviour and economic
outcomes. Chapter 5 investigates the role of intermediaries in an electronic
trade network; we focus on the question whether intermediaries can survive
in electronic markets where consumers can also contact producers directly.
Related to this subject, Chapter 6 is concerned with the spread of informa-
tion on a social network. More specifically, we study whether firms can learn
information about the social network and use this information to design bet-
ter advertising strategies. Finally, in Chapter 7 we give some concluding
remarks. Below we give a more detailed overview of the individual chapters.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the proper design and implementation of
evolutionary economic simulations. Agent-based Computational Economics
combines elements from economics and computer science. In this chapter,
we focus on the relation between the evolutionary technique that is used
and the economic problem that is modeled. Current economic simulations
often derive parameter settings for the genetic algorithm directly from the
values of the economic model parameters. In this chapter we show that this
practice may hinder the performance of the GA and thereby hinder agent
learning. More specifically, we show that economic model parameters and
evolutionary algorithm parameters should be treated separately by compar-
ing two widely used approaches to population learning with respect to their
convergence properties and robustness.
Chapter 3 is also concerned with the Cournot model. In this chapter we
present an individual learning model which allows us to compare different
types of agents with different levels of rationality that are interacting in
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the market. A Cournot duopoly market modeled as a co-evolving system
of autonomous interacting agents is investigated. We present results for
different types of boundedly rational agents. Agent types differ both in
the complexity of their strategies and the information they have available
to make their decision. Some types of agents use very simple strategies
to make a production decision, while other types use a quite sophisticated
decision rule. All agents types are tested in a round robin tournament. We
consider the evolutionary stability of the evolving populations, especially
with respect to the different equilibria of the Cournot game. Furthermore,
we investigate the performance of the different agent types under changing
market conditions.
In Chapter 4 we return to a population learning model but the focus
of this chapter is on the structure of the interaction and the influence of
the recombination operator on the outcomes of the simulation. The evo-
lution of cooperation in a system of agents playing the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (IPD) is investigated. We present results for the standard two-
person IPD as well as the more general N-person IPD (NIPD) game. In
our computational model, agents have visible tags and choose whether to
interact or not based upon these tags. We consider the evolutionary stabil-
ity of the evolving populations. We extend previous work by introducing
sexual reproduction (recombination) of strategies and by analyzing its in-
fluence on the evolving populations. We observed the occasional formation
of very stable cooperative societies, as opposed to previous results without
sexual reproduction. These cooperative societies are able to resist invasions
of “mimics” (defecting agents with the tag of a cooperating agent).
Chapter 5 builds on the techniques presented in the previous chapters
to address the question whether intermediaries will still exist and be able to
make a profit if consumers can make direct connections with producers, as is
often the case in electronic commerce. We have performed agent-based sim-
ulations to study the performance of intermediaries under different market
conditions. We modeled an electronic trade network where an information
good is traded over the network. Each trade period cost-minimizing con-
sumers have to decide which links to form to sellers (i.e., producers and
intermediaries); the good can only be purchased if a link between the buyer
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and the seller exists. Links thus represent trading possibilities or a flow of
relevant information (i.e., price quotes between potential buyers and sellers
in our case). The consumers in the model have to make a strategic decision
about which (costly) links to form. We have used an evolutionary algorithm
to model the search and learning behavior of the buyers. Our main finding
is that if market dynamics are sufficiently complex, intermediaries that have
better knowledge about the market than the average consumer are initially
able to increase their market share and make a profit.
Chapter 6 investigates the spread of information on a social network.
The network consists of agents that are exposed to the introduction of a
new product. Consumers decide whether or not to buy the product based
on their own preferences and the decisions of their neighbors in the social
network. We have used and extended concepts from the literature on epi-
demics and herd behavior to study this problem. The central question of
this chapter is whether firms can learn about the network structure and
consumer characteristics when only limited information is available, and
use this information to evolve a successful directed advertising strategy. In
order to do so, we have extended existing models to allow for heterogeneous
agents and positive as well as negative externalities. The firm can learn a
directed advertising strategy that takes into account both the topology of
the social consumer network and the characteristics of the consumer. Such
directed advertising strategies outperform random advertising.
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Chapter 2
Robust Evolutionary Algorithm
Design for Economic Modeling
2.1 Introduction
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) concerns the computational
study of economies modeled as evolving systems of autonomous interact-
ing agents (Tesfatsion 2001). The ACE approach combines elements from
evolutionary economics, cognitive science and computer science. Evolution-
inspired algorithms, such as genetic algorithms are increasingly used in ACE
(Arifovic 1994, Dawid 1999, Arthur 1993, Chen and Yeh 2001, Tsang and
Li 2000). Evolutionary algorithms are biologically inspired techniques that
use the concept of “survival of the fittest” to evolve agent behaviour that
becomes better and better adapted to the environment (i.e., a particular
market). Evolutionary algorithms thus provide us with a way to model
boundedly rational agent learning and decision making. The popularity
of evolutionary algorithms in economic simulations can be attributed to
the fact that they allow us to model large systems of boundedly ratio-
nal agents from the bottom up. Evolutionary algorithms were originally
designed for and used in optimization problems and there is a vast litera-
ture that describes how to tune the algorithm to perform well in optimiza-
tion problems (Jong 1975, Grefenstette 1986, Ba¨ck et al. 1997a, Tuson and
Ross 1998). Now that evolutionary algorithms are also used in the social
simulation domain these guidelines have to be reestablished. Current eco-
nomic simulations often derive parameter settings for the genetic algorithm
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directly from the values of the economic model parameters. In this chap-
ter we show that this practice may hinder the performance of the GA and
thereby hinder agent learning. Furthermore, by comparing two widely used
approaches to evolutionary algorithm learning, we show that, in order to ob-
tain robust results, economic model parameters and evolutionary algorithm
parameters should be treated separately.
In the first approach, the evolutionary population is considered as a
population of agents (one chromosome equals one agent) whereas in the
second approach the evolutionary population is considered as a population
of strategies from which the agents can choose. We show that the first
approach (direct evolutionary interpretation of the economic model) may
lead to premature convergence of the genetic algorithm. Robustness to
variations in the parameter settings is particularly important in social sim-
ulation since it is often difficult to give a direct economic interpretation of
a particular evolutionary algorithm parameter (such as population size or
recombination rate). This makes it impossible to interpret the economic
meaning of a simulation outcome that changes when a technical parameter
is slightly changed. Therefore, in order to derive any results from evolu-
tionary social simulation it is important that results are valid for a wider
range of parameter settings, that is that they are robust. In this chap-
ter, the focus is on robustness with respect to the technical evolutionary
algorithm parameters. The chapter proceeds by giving a general overview
of genetic algorithms in Section 2.2 and a discussion of the interpretation
of both genetic algorithms models for the learning behavior of economic
agents in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes the different experiments that
were performed and results are given in Section 2.5. Finally, conclusions
are given in Section 2.6.
2.2 Evolutionary algorithms
An evolutionary algorithm (EA) is a technique that uses the concept of
“survival of the fittest” to evolve a population of strategies (Holland 1975,
Mitchell 1996). Using an EA, strategies are represented as chromosomes and
the chromosomes evolve from generation to generation yielding better and
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better strategies. A typical EA can be described as follows (Mitchell 1996).
First, a population of randomly initialized chromosomes is generated. The
population is subsequently changed and improved in a number of gener-
ations by means of selection, recombination (“crossover”), and mutation.
Selection chooses the better chromosomes (with higher accumulated pay-
off) that will serve as parents for the next generation of strategies. This
corresponds to the concept of “survival of the fittest” in nature. Offspring is
then formed by pairwise recombination of the parents. Finally, the offspring
chromosomes are slightly changed (with a small probability) and the new
population replaces the old one.
Thus, an EA has several parameters, being among others the mutation
rate (the probability for a gene or bit in a chromosome to change), the
population size (the number of chromosomes in the population), the re-
combination rate (the percentage of chromosomes that will be subject to
recombination) and the representation of the chromosome. The values of
these parameters have to be carefully chosen in order for the EA to perform
well. Although there are no conclusive results on which parameter settings
allow effective EA performance, there are some general guidelines available,
see for examples (Mitchell 1996, Ba¨ck et al. 1997b).
2.2.1 Parameter issues
Particularly important in this chapter is the avoidance of premature conver-
gence by allowing the population diversity of the GA to be sufficient, that is
a sufficient number of different elements (chromosomes) must be present in
the population to avoid sampling errors due to small population size. This
is a merely technical condition, under which the highly stylized EA opera-
tors (mutation, recombination, selection) and parameters operate properly.
Premature convergence restricts the EA in its learning capabilities. This
occurs when, early in the search process, the EA focuses on the exploitation
of a small selection of rather fit strategies at the expense of the exploration
of other regions of the search space. In optimization problems premature
convergence causes the EA to get stuck in various local optima (in different
runs), while lacking the diversity to explore other regions of the search space
and find the global optimum. To preserve sufficient diversity and to avoid
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premature convergence, the values of the EA-parameters have to be care-
fully chosen. Known factors that influence the diversity of the population
(and thus the occurrence of premature convergence) are among others mu-
tation rate, population size, selection pressure and the chosen chromosome
representation (Ba¨ck et al. 1997a). The length and representation of the
chromosome affect convergence. The representation that is chosen should
be able to represent all possible strategy values. Furthermore, we consider
it good practice to choose chromosome length and representation in such
a way that the average outcome of randomly initialized population of the
chromosomes does not lie on or close to equilibrium values of the economic
model.
2.3 Economic interpretation of genetic algorithms
Two general approaches to social or population learning can be distin-
guished and each approach represents a different economic interpretation
of genetic algorithm learning. In the first approach each agent is repre-
sented by a single chromosome in the EA population as in Dawid (1999)
and Vriend (2000). In this approach the number of chromosomes equals the
number of economic agents. In the second approach the population of chro-
mosomes and the economic model are separated, as in Axelrod (1987) and
Riechmann (2001b). The population of chromosomes is regarded as a pool
of strategies from which the agents can choose. Both approaches consider
the recombination operator as a model of information exchange between
two agents or strategies, whereas the mutation operator is regarded as a
model for error or innovation. Although there thus exists an economic in-
terpretation of the genetic operators the modeler should be very careful in
interpreting the economic meaning of simulation results. It is very difficult
to attach an economic meaning to social simulation results that were ob-
tained using specific values for the GA parameters, in particular if outcomes
change considerably with small changes of the parameters. In general, we
propose that in order to make valid economic interpretations based on evo-
lutionary simulations - results should be robust, that is valid for a larger
range of parameter settings.
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Several authors have commented on the economic interpretation of genetic
algorithms (Chattoe 1998, Dawid 1999, Edmonds 2001, Klos 1999). A com-
monly heard objection against this interpretation is that in population based
evolutionary algorithms, strategies are shared by all agents. This means
that agents have direct insight into which strategies were used by others.
Furthermore, agents can copy (parts of) strategies from (well performing)
others by means of selection and recombination. This is not true for many
social systems; economic agents (firms, bargaining individuals), for exam-
ple, often make great efforts to hide their strategies from their competitors.
This suggests that the use of GAs as a model for agent learning is only valid
when the strategies that are considered are simple actions that are observ-
able in the market. The second modeling approach (chromosome equals a
single strategy) is therefore preferred to the chromosome-equals-agent ap-
proach of population learning. Below we will illustrate this by showing the
robustness results obtained for a large range of values.
2.4 Experimental setup
This section describes the experimental setup that was used to investigate
the effect of evolutionary model parameter settings on economic outcomes.
As described above two main approaches can be distinguished (see Ta-
ble 2.1). Using approach I (Dawid 1999, Vriend 2000), each agent is repre-
sented by a single strategy in the genetic population. The second approach
allows an agent to pick a strategy from a large population of strategies.
In approach I the value of the genetic algorithm parameter population size
(that is the number of strategies in the genetic pool) is directly determined
by the economic model. In approach II this is not the case. Using approach
II (Axelrod 1987, Riechmann 2001b), we have to set the value for the popu-
lation size in such a way that the economic outcomes are robust to changes
of the parameter values (both economic and genetic).
2.4.1 The Cournot oligopoly
The testbed for our simulations is a textbook (Varian 1992, Cournot 1897)
Cournot oligopoly market with 4 players. We develop an evolutionary sim-
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Approach I Approach II
Chromosome = Agent Chromosome = Strategy
Population size determined by Population size determined by
number of economic agents proper EA learning
Table 2.1: Summarizing the two evolutionary learning approaches.
ulation of this model and use it to compare both approaches. The rest of
this section will describe the Cournot oligopoly and the setup of the evolu-
tionary simulation. We use a population learning evolutionary algorithm to
model the search and learning behaviour of economic agents in a Cournot
oligopoly game with four agents. The Cournot oligopoly market describes a
situation where a few firms compete in a single market. The firms have some
market influence through a common price demand curve. In this situation,
firms have to make a strategic decision, taking into account the decisions
of the other firms. Here we focus on the Cournot oligopoly which provides
a model for the market when the firms produce a homogeneous good and
compete on quantity q. The 4 firm oligopoly model we use is characterized
by the following equations:
Market price : P = 256−Q,where Q =
∑4
i=1 qi
Profit firm i : pii = Pqi − 56qi
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs when each firm’s output is a best
response to the combined output of the other firms—at output q=40. When
firms produce at the competitive outcome, each produces an output of on
average 50 and the firms make no profit. Profits are highest when the 4
firms act as a single monopolist and produce the collusive output of on
average 25 per firm. Collusion usually does not occur in the one-shot game.
A general outline of the Cournot oligopoly simulation is given below.
Each period an agent draws a strategy from the population of strategies. If
approach I is used the number of strategies is equal to the number of agents
(4 in this chapter). Using approach II we have to find a suitable population
size (the number of strategies/chromosomes in the genetic population). In
order to do this we incrementally (steps of 4) increase the population size
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and run the system repeatedly with a large number of values for the pop-
ulation sizes. Another parameter that influences simulation results is the
representation of the strategies, in particular the length of the strategy.
Longer strategies represent larger possible output values. Initializing the
population with a representation that allows agents to produce quantities
that greatly exceed demand can be done if the modeler does not want the
agents to have any a priori knowledge about the market (everything has to
be learned). Again we look for settings that render robust results.
Outline of the simulation model:
Step 1 Select strategy:
Each agent randomly draws a strategy
from the population of strategies
Step 2 Determine action
Step 3 Play game
Step 4 Assign payoff
The fitness of a strategy equals
the payoff gained by the agent
using the strategy
Step 5 If all strategies have been used:
Update strategies using EA
Table 2.2 gives an overview of the parameter settings used in the experi-
ments. The smallest population size tested was 4 (i.e, equal to the num-
ber of agents - Approach I) and the largest population size tested 200.
The chromosome length was varied between 6 (maximum output 64) and
9 (maximum output 512). In all cases the average output of a randomly
initialized population does not lie on the Cournot-Nash or the competitive
equilibrium. The structure of the initial population is determined by the
initial density parameter. A population that is initialized with a density
of 0.5 (the default value), fifty percent of the bits is set to 1 on average.
The values for the mutation rate are within the range of commonly rec-
ommended values (Grefenstette 1986). We consider the convergence of the
model with respect to the different outcomes of the game for a large range
of values of the size of the population of strategies. Each period of the game
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agents select a strategy from the population of strategies. This population
is subsequently updated by a genetic algorithm. The general outline of the
simulation model is described below. A genetic algorithm is said to converge
if almost all strategies in the population are identical. Note that there can
be no convergence in the mathematical sense, for the mutations disrupt the
uniform state over and over again.
I II
Economic Model Parameters
Number of Agents 4 4
EA Parameters
Crossover Rate 1.0 1.0
Mutation Rate (per bit) 0.01 0.01
Population Size 4 4-200
(increments 4)
Chromosome Length 6–9 6–9
Representation binary binary
Initial Density 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 0.1, 0.5, 0.9
Table 2.2: Parameter settings used in the Cournot oligopoly experiments. Approach I is the
methodology where a chromosome equals an agent whereas in approach II a chromosome
equals a strategy.
2.5 Robustness results
This section describes the experiments we have performed comparing ap-
proach I and II to social learning. We are especially interested in the robust-
ness properties of the two approaches. Apart from looking at the population
size we study the behaviour of both approaches under different initial condi-
tions and different representations. In all simulations we have used a simple
GA with mutation rate 0.01 and crossover rate 1.0. First we study the effect
of population size on the outcome of the Cournot oligopoly game. We start
by initializing the population size at 4 (approach I) and then increasing
this value (with steps of size 4) to determine a population size that yields
robust results. Figure 2.1 shows the results of our experiments for different
representations (chromosome lengths). The first figure (left) represents the
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relationship between average output and population size. Each point in
the graph represents the average over 20 runs of 400 generations each (gen-
eration 100-500 to compensate for initial noise effects) that were executed
using each value of the population size. The initial population density is
0.5 in these experiments, that is, initially half of the bits is set to one. The
second figure (right) gives the standard deviation of average output over
those 20 runs for each tested value of the population size. Results are given
for different representations of the strategies, that is chromosome length
6,7,8 and 9.
2.5.1 Aggregate results
The outcomes for population size 4 correspond to approach I and we can de-
duce from the figure that population sizes of around 100 chromosomes would
be suitable for approach II. Notice that for small values of the population
size the difference between individual runs is very large (high standard devi-
ation) whereas averages converge towards the Cournot-Nash value for larger
values of the population size. Convergence is slower for longer chromosome
length where genetic drift causes averages to go up (as chromosome length
increases, a random mutation is more likely to lead to a large increase in
production than with smaller chromosome lengths). Note that simulations
using different representations all converge to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
with small standard deviation for sufficiently large population sizes. Fur-
thermore, Figure 2.1 suggests that convergence is not robust with respect
to representation for small population sizes.
To gain more insight in the convergence behaviour of both approaches we
take a look at the average population behaviour using approach I and II. Fig-
ure 2.2 shows the average population behaviour for different representations
and different initial conditions over 500 generations. All tested chromosome
lengths allow the agents to produce at both the Cournot-Nash and compet-
itive output levels and therefore do not constrain their production capacity
in any way. The results show that approach I is not robust with respect
to representation, that is different representations yield different economic
outcomes. On the other hand population averages do converge towards
Cournot-Nash outputs irrespective of representation length if approach II
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Figure 2.1: Average output versus population size, averages (left) and standard deviations
(right) over 20 runs. Each plotted value represents the average output over 20 runs and
over the last 400 generations (generation 100 to 500) to eliminate initial noise effects.
is used. If we look at convergence behaviour with respect to initial popula-
tion density we see again that approach I does not yield robust results for
all representations. Only for chromosome length 7 we observe convergence
towards the competitive equilibrium for all tested initial conditions. We
will take a closer look at the individual runs in the next section to futher
study the convergence behaviour. The outcomes in Figure 2.2 suggest that
the lack of robustness is caused by premature convergence caused by a lack
of diversity in the population. Very small (0.1) or very large (0.9) initial
densities lead to an almost uniform population and this effect is of course
strongest for small population sizes. While some learning towards profitable
outcomes occurs under these conditions, the population converges before a
good outcome is reached. Indeed we see that outcomes for different rep-
resentations show most agreement for initial density 0.5 when population
diversity is maximized.
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Figure 2.2: Average output for different population sizes - averages over 20 runs. Approach
I: population size 4, Approach II population size 100. Note that the y-axis is larger for
initial density 0.9 to accomodate all outcomes.
2.5.2 Individual runs
Figures 2.3 through 2.6 show the twenty individual runs for each approach.
Notice that there is no uniform convergence when approach I is used. More
specifically, if we look at the results for chromosome length 7 in Figure 2.4
(bottom half) we see that the apparent convergence to the competitive
equilibrium is only present at the aggregate level. Furthermore, we see that
individual runs sometimes converge to very large output values (Figure 2.6)
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leading to losses for the agents. Here learning stops before profitable out-
comes are reached. If approach II is used, however we see that all individual
runs converge towards the Cournot-Nash level where each agent’s output is
a best response to the aggregate output of the other agents. The agents ob-
tain higher profits when their aggregate output is at the Cournot-Nash level
than at the competitive level. These results show that a significantly large
population of chromosomes is needed to prevent premature convergence
to a less profitable outcome. Population learning genetic algorithms can
thus be used to model boundedly rational agents in the Cournot oligopoly
game. Evolutionary algorithm learning is a sufficiently powerful learning
technique to arrive at the Cournot-Nash outcome in a population learning
setting. When GA learning is inhibited by small population sizes, the learn-
ing outcome depends strongly on the initial population and GA learning is
reduced to imitation based learning. We have performed some experiments
to illustrate this effect in the next section.
2.5.3 From imitation based learning to GA learning
The evolutionary algorithm is built using selection, recombination and mu-
tation. If we look at each of these components separately, we can gain
further insight into the effects of population diversity. An algorithm us-
ing only selection (imitation) can be compared to replicator dynamics a
simple learning model that is often used in economics (Fudenberg and
Levine 1998b, Weibull 2002, Mailath 1992). The difference between replica-
tor dynamics and genetic algorithm learning is that replicator dynamics is
solely based on imitation while innovation through recombination and muta-
tion are integral parts of genetic algorithm performance. Another difference
between genetic algorithms and replicator dynamics is the way fitnesses are
compared. In replicator dynamics, agents can imitate strategies used by a
direct opponent while in a GA, strategies used in all games are compared
population wide. Theoretical results using replicator dynamics in oligopoly
settings show that there is convergence towards the competitive equilibrium
in the long run as long as the competitive outcome is present in the initial
population (Vega-Redondo 1997). Replicator dynamics is based on imita-
tion of more successful strategies. To illustrate the learning capabilities of
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Figure 2.3: Individual runs for chromosome length 6. Note that not all axes are equal in
order to accommodate all results.
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a properly set up GA, we have extended a replicator dynamics version of
the Cournot oligopoly with recombination and mutation. We have used
the method of fitness comparison used in replicator dynamics (only imitate
strategies of direct opponents). Furthermore, we have inserted the com-
petitive outcomes in the initial population, as in Vega-Redondo (1997) .
These experiments can give us some insight in how the recombination and
mutation operator of the GA are influenced by small population sizes. Av-
erages over 20 runs are given in Figures 2.7 and 2.8. Results are shown for
only selection (imitation) and imitation plus recombination and mutation
(mutation rate 0.1) for chromosome length 7. We see that the convergence
behaviour of the imitation based learner is less influenced by the population
size than that of the GA. Using a sufficiently large population size, GA con-
vergence towards the Cournot-Nash outcome can be observed even when a
relative fitness measure is used. This shows that approach II is indeed robust
with respect to initial conditions, representation and also transformation of
the fitness function. This is important since many economic applications
are characterized by relative rather than absolute fitness measures.
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Figure 2.7: The influence of population size on imitation based and GA learning. Averages
over 20 runs.
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2.6 Conclusions
We have compared two widely used approaches to evolutionary population
learning. In the first approach population size is determined by the number
of agents in the economic model while in the second approach these eco-
nomic and technical parameters are treated separately. We show that the
first approach can lead to premature convergence, inhibiting the learning
capabilities of the agents, related to the abstract learning technique. The
second approach leads to robust outcomes with respect to population size,
initial density, representation of the strategies and fitness evaluation. These
experiments show that economic model parameters and evolutionary algo-
rithm parameters should be treated separately to allow for robust results.
Furthermore, the modeler should make sure that simulation outcomes are
robust with respect to changes in the experimental setup.
Chapter 3
Heterogeneous, Boundedly Rational
Agents
3.1 Introduction
The duopoly market describes a situation where two firms compete in a
single market. Both firms influence the market through a common price
demand curve. In this situation, firms have to make a strategic decision,
taking into account the decision of the other firm. In this chapter we focus
again on the Cournot (Cournot 1897) duopoly which provides a model for
the market when the two firms produce a homogeneous good and compete
on quantity.
In most theoretical models of the Cournot duopoly game, agents are fully
rational: they know their own reaction curves, have exact information about
the actions of the other firm and take rational decisions. In this chapter we
examine different types of so-called boundedly rational agents (Simon 1984,
Albin 1998, Sargent 1993). These agents do not have access to all the infor-
mation needed to make a rational decision. Agents have to make a decision
based on incomplete and uncertain information such as, for example, their
expectations about the behavior of the other agent. Some types of agents
use very simple expectation formation techniques, while other agent types
exhibit more sophisticated behavior.
We investigate the outcomes the different types of agents will achieve in
the repeated Cournot game under both stable and changing market condi-
tions. We are especially interested to see whether agents will achieve the
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socially desirable competitive market outcome or the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium outcome, and under what circumstances the agents learn to sustain
the inherently unstable cartel outcome. To model this learning, search and
coordination process, we use a genetic algorithm.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 gives a detailed descrip-
tion of the Cournot model. In Section 3.3 a brief overview of the genetic
algorithm that is used is given. Also, the evolutionary model used in our
experiments will be explained. Section 3.4 will then describe the different
types of boundedly rational agents we study in our experiments. Section 3.5
describes the performance of the different types of agents under stable mar-
ket conditions. Section 3.6 investigates which agents perform best under
changing market conditions and conclusions are given in Section 3.7.
3.2 The Cournot duopoly game
The Cournot duopoly is a simple economic model that describes the com-
petition on quantity between two firms, say Firm 1 and Firm 2, see for
example Mas-Colell et al. (1995). The firms produce a homogeneous good
and know the price demand curve. Each firm must decide how much to pro-
duce, and the two firms make their production decision at the same time.
When making its production decision, a firm takes its competitor into ac-
count. The firms know that their competitor is also deciding how much
to produce, and the market price they receive depends on the total output
of both firms. The essence of the Cournot model is that each firm treats
the output level of its competitor as fixed, and then decides how much to
produce.
The profit-maximizing output of Firm 1 depends on how much Firm 2
will produce. If Firm 1 thinks Firm 2 will produce nothing, its demand
curve is the market demand curve. Firm 1’s profit maximizing output is
thus a decreasing function of how much it expects Firm 2 to produce. A
firm’s reaction curve tells it how much to produce, given the production
quantity of its competitor. In equilibrium, each firm chooses its production
quantity according to its own reaction curve, so the equilibrium output levels
occur at the intersection of the two reaction curves. The resulting set of
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production levels is called a Cournot equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each
firm correctly assumes how much its competitor will produce (a fulfilled
expectations equilibrium), and it maximizes its profit accordingly. Note
that this equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, each
firm is doing the best it can given what its competitors are doing. As a
result, no firm has any incentive to change its behavior. This equilibrium
is also known as a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
In the one shot game (i.e., one-time decision of the production levels) the
firms typically reach the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. However, in a repeated
game, when firms interact more than once with each other and thus can try
to influence each other’s behavior, theoretically other outcomes are also
possible. The collusive or cartel outcome occurs when firms “cooperate”
and attempt to set prices and production so as to maximize total industry
profits. A cartel is a group of firms that jointly collude to behave like a single
monopolist and maximize the sum of their profits. A cartel will typically
be unstable in the sense that each firm will be tempted to sell more than
its agreed-upon output if it believes that the other firm will not respond.
When firms do not cooperate but each competes for the biggest possi-
ble market share, the firms can also end up in the competitive equilibrium,
where each price equals marginal costs, and thus the firms make no profits.
In a typical Cournot-Nash equilibrium, profits are higher than in a compet-
itive market but lower than in the collusive or cartel situation. The price
demand function the firms face in the simulations where market conditions
remain stable is given in Equation 3.1. This function changes when perfor-
mance under changing market conditions is investigated. The (symmetric)
Cournot model we use in our experiments is defined by the following equa-
tions:
Market price : P = 128− q1 − q2 (3.1)
Profit firm 1 : pi1 = Pq1 − 56q1 (3.2)
Profit firm 2 : pi2 = Pq2 − 56q2 (3.3)
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Figure 3.1 depicts the reaction curves for both firms under these market
conditions.
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The reaction curves can be calculated from Equations 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 by
setting marginal revenue equal to marginal costs. To maximize profit, the
firms set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs:
Revenue Firm 1 : R1 = Pq1 = (128− q1 − q2)q1 = 128q1 − q
2
1 − q1q2.
MR1 = ∆R1/∆q1 = 128− 2q1 − q2 and MC1 = MC2 = 56.
Now setting MR1 equal to MC1 and solving for q1 gives Firm 1’s reaction
curve:
Firm 1 : q1 = 36−
1
2
q2 (3.4)
The same calculation applies to Firm 2 and gives Firm 2’s reaction curve:
Firm 2 : q2 = 36−
1
2
q1 (3.5)
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where the reaction curves cross and
both firms have an output level of 24. The corresponding equilibrium profits
are 576 for each firm. The competitive equilibrium that occurs when price
is equal to marginal cost (56 in our model) occurs when both firms set their
output to 36, the corresponding profits are then zero for each firm. The
profit maximizing collusive output level is reached when total production is
equal to 36.
3.3 An evolutionary Cournot duopoly model
Firms in a market learn about market conditions and the nature of their
competitors by operating in that market. By searching and learning they
find their best strategy. To model this search and learning process, we use
a genetic algorithm. Various researchers have used genetic algorithms to
simulate the behavior of a population of interacting agents (Dawid 1999,
Price 1997). Arifovic (1994), for example, showed that in a simple cobweb
model, a genetic algorithm provided a better approximation to experimental
data than traditional econometric learning rules such as least squares learn-
ing. The genetic algorithm enables us to model agent behaviour as evolving
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ideas or strategies, whereas the mechanism of “survival of the fittest” allows
for the most successful strategies to be maintained and spread throughout
the population. Using a genetic algorithm, strategies are represented as
chromosomes, and the chromosomes evolve from generation to generation
yielding better and better strategies.
Every string in the population can be seen as an economic strategy (in
our Cournot duopoly case a production rule). The selection operator and, in
particular, fitness proportional selection can be seen as a type of learning by
imitation. Individuals with a low payoff will imitate the strategies used by
successful agents. This imitation process may lead to the spreading of the
strings encoding strategies with a high payoff and the vanishing of strings
encoding poor strategies. The crossover operator is usually interpreted as a
model for communication, or information exchange between strategies. The
crossover operator differs from the selection operator in the sense that only
part of the strategy of others is imitated. Finally, the mutation operator
incorporates the effect of innovation or mistakes of the agents. Individuals
change their actions randomly, either by mistake (in copying or imitating
due to a lack of information or computational capacity) or because they
think the best actions have not been discovered yet.
In our simulation we use a multi-population model; a model of co-
evolution. This means that each firm has its own population of strate-
gies (the strategy base) and that a genetic algorithm is separately applied
to each population. Strategies then compete only against strategies in the
same population. A consequence of the multi-population model is that there
is no direct competition between the two firms, and that the firms them-
selves will not vanish. The multi-population model is graphically depicted
in Figure 3.2.
Each generation, a firm selects a strategy from the strategy base asso-
ciated with that firm. The strategy base thus represents all the knowledge
and ideas present in the firm at a particular time. The firm then uses the
chosen strategy in the market and a certain payoff is associated with the
use of that strategy. After all strategies have been tested, the strategy
base is updated by a genetic algorithm, yielding new strategies for the next
generation.
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Figure 3.2: The evolutionary model. In each Cournot duopoly game, a chromosome from
each firm’s strategy base is tested in the market. After each generation (i.e, when all rules
have been tested at least once), each firm population is separately updated by the GA.
46 Heterogeneous, Boundedly Rational Agents
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the parameter setting for the EA we use in
our experiments. The next section describes the different types of agents
that were tested in the simulations.
Parameter Value
type EA GA
selection scheme fitness proportionate
sigma scaling
recombination operator 1pt/2pt/uniform crossover
mutation rate fixed 0.01...0.1
chromosome length dependent 1/l
for chromosome length l
crossover probability 1
population size 60
encoding gray coding
game length 10 iterations
# generations 100
# runs 10
Table 3.1: Evolutionary model parameters.
3.4 Heterogeneous agents
This section describes the different types of boundedly rational agents we
have implemented and tested. Agents are boundedly rational because they
do not have all the information needed to make a rational decision. Instead,
they use heuristic rules or strategies to arrive at a production decision.
The different types of strategies have different informational and compu-
tational requirements. The goal of our experimentation is to investigate
which strategies are most successful in a repeated Cournot duopoly game
and what outcomes they will yield. The strategies we have tested differ in
the amount of information they need to be executed and the computational
capacity they require. Some strategies use a very simple heuristic to arrive
at a production decision while other strategies make extensive use of data
from past periods. In our simulation, all the agents within one firm use
the same type of strategy, so we can identify agents with strategy types.
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Some of the agents use simple strategies that have also been analytically
studied, see for example Young (1998). We start by describing these simple
strategies and gradually move on to more complex agents.
3.4.1 Static agents
The first agent type that we have tested is the static expectations agent.
Agents that use static expectations, have a fixed assumption (during the
repeated game) about the quantity their competitor will produce. The
chromosome of such an agent contains its static expectation about the pro-
duction level of its competitor. This expectation is the only evolving value
in the case of static agents. In the game, the agents determine their own
output by calculating the best reply to this expected quantity (using the
Cournot model from Figure 3.1). Because expectations are static, they are
not even updated when the agents play an iterated Cournot game. There-
fore, the (average) profits of agents playing the Cournot game are equal
irrespective of the number of iterations played.
3.4.2 Adaptive and naive agents
As opposed to static agents, adaptive agents adjust their expectations about
the behavior of their opponents on the basis of the results from previous
iterations. “Adaptive expectations” means that the expected quantity at
time t (Qexp(t)) is a weighted average of yesterday’s quantity (Q(t−1)) and
yesterday’s expected quantity (Qexp(t− 1)), that is:
Qexp(t) = wQ(t− 1) + (1− w)Qexp(t− 1), where 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. (3.6)
The parameter w of the forecasting function is learned and updated by
the genetic algorithm, as is the expected quantity of the competitor in the
first iteration (Qexp(0)). The expected quantity thus always lies between
yesterday’s quantity and yesterday’s expected quantity, that is w has to
satisfy 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. A special case of adaptive expectations occurs when
w = 1, in that case the agent assumes the competitor will produce the
exact same amount he produced in the previous period. These are called
naive expectations.
48 Heterogeneous, Boundedly Rational Agents
3.4.3 Imitate agents
The imitate agent is the first agent that does not have any knowledge about
its reaction curve. The imitate agent plays a tit-for-tat-like (Axelrod 1984)
strategy that mimics the competitor’s strategy. Each iteration the imitate
agents produce the exact same quantity that their competitor produced the
previous iteration. The agents thus do not need to know their reaction
curves. Since this agent reacts to its opponent’s move it is theoretically
capable of eliciting collusion. The learned parameter in case of imitative
agents is the initial belief about the quantity the competitor produced.
3.4.4 Incomplete information agents
The incomplete information agent uses adaptive expectations in the same
way as the adaptive agent. But in addition this agent does not know his re-
action curve beforehand. The parameters of the reaction curve are encoded
on the chromosome, and the agents learns its best replies through evolu-
tion. Furthermore, this agent has the possibility to react to its opponent’s
behavior, which makes collusion possible. As with the adaptive agents, the
chromosome of the incomplete information agent describes its initial belief
about the quantity the opponent will produce and a weight that is used to
update expectations. Furthermore, three parameters that define a linear re-
action curve are encoded on the chromosome. The reaction curve is defined
by the three learned coefficients a, b and c as described below:
(a + 1)−
(
b + 1
c + 1
)
· expectation (3.7)
In addition to the information contained on their chromosomes, incomplete-
information agents also have a memory that contains the quantity produced
by their competitor in the previous round of the repeated Cournot duopoly
game. The memory is not placed on the chromosome and is updated each
iteration. The memory of the agents is initialized randomly at the start of
the game.
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3.4.5 Conditional agents
Conditional agents make their output decisions conditional on some in-
formation. They do not, however, possess detailed information about the
actions or strategies of their competitor. The conditional agent makes his
production decision based upon the profit he received in the previous round.
The conditional agent is the first agent of all agents described that does not
need to know the exact quantity his opponent produced in the previous
round. The quantity the conditional agent produces depends on the profit
he received in the previous period. This agent has three values encoded on
his chromosome: quantity1, quantity2, and reservation profit. If the actual
profit the agent receives is lower than his reservation profit, the agent will
produce quantity1 in the next period, otherwise he will produce quantity2.
This mechanism gives the agent the opportunity to influence his opponent’s
behavior and to guarantee a minimum acceptable profit.
3.4.6 Autoregressive agents
The autoregressive agent uses price-data from previous periods to make a
production decision. The strategy for an autoregressive agent with history
n is shown in Equation 3.8:
Qn+1 = a0 + a1(Pn) + a2(Pn−1) + ...... + an(P1) (3.8)
where the ai’s (a = 0, 1....n) are the coefficients that determine the weight
of the results of a certain period and are encoded on the chromosome.
3.5 Results for stable market conditions
Table 3.2 shows some characteristics of the different agent types. The first
column states whether the agents know their own best-reply curves. The
second column denotes what the agents know about the history of the game.
A memory of n indicates that the agent has information about the quantities
that were produced in the past n iterations. In addition to the information
contained on their chromosomes the agents also have a memory that con-
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tains the quantity produced by their competitor in the previous round of the
repeated Cournot duopoly game (except for the static expectations agent).
Type of Agent Reaction Curve Memory Learned Parameter
(periods) (by EA)
Static Expectations known none Qexp(0)
Naive Expectations known 1 Qexp(0)
Adaptive Expectations known 1 Qexp(0), w
Imitate not known 1 Qexp(0)
Incomplete Information not known 1 Qexp(0),
Reaction Curve
Conditional not known 1 conditional outputs
Autoregressive not known n weights
Table 3.2: Some characteristics of the different agent types. Column 2 states for each agent
type whether agents know their own reaction curves. Column 3 states the knowledge the
agents have about the history of the game.
The profits obtained by the agents in a round robin tournament are shown
below in Table 3.3 (averaged over 20 runs). Theoretically, agents produc-
ing their Cournot-Nash outputs will obtain a profit of 576, while colluding
agents will obtain the average cartel profit of 648. An example of a single
run is shown in Figure 3.3 for two static expectations agents. We see that
the profits for the static agents are close to the Cournot-Nash outcomes
under stable market conditions. Agent performance was tested and found
robust under a wide variety of parameter settings. Table 3.3 shows us that
the simple imitate agents perform very well and are able of colluding with
other agents to obtain outcomes close to the cartel profits. Furthermore,
we see that the performance of an agent against its own type is a good
indicator of its performance against other agent types. Also, in order to
obtain high profits it is important to have a “well-performing” competitor,
that is, some amount of cooperation and coordination is necessary to arrive
at Cournot-Nash or cartel outcomes.
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Average Profits Stat. Naiv. Adap. Imit. In.Inf. Cond. AR.
Static 503 516 467 598 478 432 443
Naive 454 465 449 607 432 429 433
Adaptive 499 328 144 560 330 351 156
Imitate 601 598 572 605 458 442 151
Incomplete Info 362 416 334 379 425 410 388
Conditional 401 413 344 374 378 398 213
Autoregressive 400 248 233 164 148 150 153
Table 3.3: Average Profits over 20 runs, 1000 generations in a round robin tournament
under stable market conditions. Entries denote profits obtained by the row player.
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Figure 3.3: Profits of static expectations agents under stable market conditions, a typical
run.
3.6 Performance under changing market conditions
So far we have only considered a stable market situation. In such a static
environment, the duopoly game is an optimization game. We have seen
that a genetic algorithm is capable of solving this optimization problem,
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especially when chromosomes are short. The results from the previous two
sections suggest that the simple agents outperform the more sophisticated
agents. One obvious reason for this is the longer chromosome length of the
sophisticated agents. With longer chromosomes, the search space is much
bigger and the evolutionary algorithm may take longer to converge to and
find good strategies. This process becomes more difficult as there are more
dependencies between the different parts of the chromosome. The strength
of the sophisticated agents is that they have adaptive and learning capa-
bilities as part of their strategies. To see whether this learning capabilities
actually enable the agents to make higher profits we have to test the agents
in a dynamic environment. In this section we perform experiments where
the agents not only have to deal with changes in their environment due to
endogenous factors, i.e., the agents they compete against change from gen-
eration to generation, but the market is also subject to exogenous changes
i.e., in our case; shifts in demand. Thus not only do the agents operate in
a changing environment, but they do so under a changing fitness function:
The price demand curve slightly changes every generation in a continuous
fashion. This allows us to test which types of agents adapt faster to the
new market situation.
We have chosen a model where demand increases or decreases depending
on the time step (iterations or generations). This is done by adjusting the
change parameter δ in the inverse demand curve P = 128 − δ(q1 + q2).
At the start of the simulation the change parameter is set to one, that
is the simulation starts from the static market situation discussed in the
previous section. The parameter δ changes as follows: δ = 1 ± gen ÷
(x + 1) where x is a number between 0 and 100. The simulation continues
for 100 generations. Performance will be measured by comparing average
profits with Cournot Nash and Collusive profits in each situation. Since
circumstances change in these models, we do not test agent types with static
elements in their strategies such as the static, adaptive and naive strategies
discussed in Section 3.4. Furthermore, in the dynamic experiments each
strategy is tested only once each time step. This way the simulation can
be seen as a time series. Table 3.4 summarizes the outcomes for these
experiments.
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Agent type Profit Std Cournot Nash Collusive
Conditional 1505 49 1760 1980
Incomplete Information 1466 47 1760 1980
Imitate 1441 68 1760 1980
Table 3.4: Averages over 100 generations, 20 runs in a dynamic market. Entries denote
average profits obtained in a round robin tournament.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show two individual runs of the experiments. Figure 3.4
describes the profits of conditional agents in a dynamic environment where
market circumstances change every generation under a fluctuating scenario.
The conditional agent is able to adapt to the changing market condition.
Figure 3.5 describes the profits of incomplete information agents in a dy-
namic environment where market circumstances change every generation.
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Figure 3.4: Profits of conditional agents in a dynamic environment where market circum-
stances change every generation: fluctuating scenario. Averages over 20 runs.
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3.7 Conclusions
We investigate a Cournot duopoly market modeled as a co-evolving system
of autonomous interacting agents. We present results for different types of
boundedly rational agents. Agent types differ both in the complexity of
their strategies and the information they have available to make their pro-
duction decision. Some types of agents use very simple strategies to make
a production decision, while other types use a more sophisticated decision
rule. We consider the evolutionary stability of the evolving populations,
especially with respect to the different equilibria of the Cournot game. Fur-
thermore, we investigate the performance of the different agent types under
changing market conditions.
Most evolutionary simulations study agent behavior and adaptability
under endogenous changes in the environment, due to the evolving strategies
of the other agents in the simulation. Here, we also consider responses
to changes in the exogenous variables, i.e., the model parameters. Under
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these changing conditions, agents learn production rules that apply to many
situations instead of just one output value. We evolve several types of
more-sophisticated agents that perform well under changing circumstances.
Specifically, agents are able to obtain Cournot-Nash and for some settings
even collusive outcomes. In a static situation however, simple agents using
traditional learning rules such as naive or adaptive updating, performed
better than the sophisticated agents. The simulations were performed using
genetic algorithms: we have investigated the performance under a wide
variety of parameter settings for the GA.
Chapter 4
Tag-Mediated Interaction
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter addressed boundedly rational strategies that allowed
agents to make decisions when they had only limited information available.
This chapter focuses on another mechanism that allows agents to reduce
the complexity of their decision environment, namely selective interaction.
Using selective interaction, agents are not equally likely to interact with all
other agents, as is often assumed in economic theory. Furthermore, agents
can make their actions conditional on the identity, appearance or reputation
of their opponent. We study the effects of selective interaction by looking at
the problem of the emergence of cooperation under difficult circumstances.
An important topic in the fields of biology, economics, and sociology
is the “spontaneous” emergence of cooperation in large systems of selfish
agents (Axelrod 1984), such as animals in ecosystems or economic agents
in markets. Again, we use an agent-based computational economics (ACE)
(Vriend 1995, Tesfatsion 2001) approach in this chapter. ACE researchers
attempt to model economic systems “bottom up”. That is, by modeling the
behaviour of individual economic agents and their interactions, the emer-
gence of market behaviour is studied and simulated. ACE thus approaches
an economy of agents as a complex adaptive system (Holland 1995). The
evolution of such a complex multi-agent system is simulated in this chapter
by an evolutionary algorithm (EA) (Mitchell 1996), a recent tool to simulate
learning in multi-agent systems. Note that a mathematical analysis of such
systems adressing learning behaviour (for instance using Markov chains) is
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in general hardly feasible and has only been possible for some well-fitted or
simple problems (Kandori et al. 1993, Young 1993, Axtell et al. 2000).
It has been suggested (Holland 1995, Riolo 1997a) that under difficult
circumstances (i.e., when agents are tempted to display uncooperative be-
havior), “tags” might be useful in promoting the evolution of cooperation.
Tags (visible marks) enable agents to distinguish to some extent between
other players and bias their behavior accordingly. The research on tags is
motivated by the observation that humans often make use of visible marks
to quickly classify the other party and in this way to guide the interaction.
Axelrod (1984) mentions, for instance, that tags can help to establish stable
forms of stereotyping and the formation of groups, even when these tags are
not based on objective differences. The reason is that they facilitate selec-
tive interaction. In other words, they allow agents to discriminate among
agents or objects that would otherwise be indistinguishable.
The key idea is that tags become associated with certain types of be-
haviour and that agents then learn this association. An agent who discovers
such an association between tags and behaviour could profit from that in-
formation. As evolution proceeds, more agents discover the profitable rule,
and the stereotype becomes soundly established. With the establishment of
a stereotype, however, also comes the emergence of mimics (Holland 1993):
agents that use the tag associated with a certain behaviour but in fact
display different behaviour. If the proportion of mimics in a population be-
comes very large, however, the other agents will probably react to this and
the tag will lose its meaning. An interesting example is the role of fashion
as a “tag” to identify people as members of a certain social group.
Previous studies on related topics are the following. Nowak and Sig-
mund (1998) investigate the role of “images” in the emergence of indirect
reciprocity. Similar to tags, images are parts of an agent that are visible to
the other agents. However, the images have a fixed meaning and truthfully
reveal information, while tags do not have an explicit and predetermined
meaning. Axtell et al. (2000) investigate a simplified “dividing-the-dollar”
game where agents adjust their strategy on the basis of the tag of their
opponent. They investigate a Markov-chain model of two fixed-size tag
groups where the agents can condition their strategy upon the tag of their
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opponent. This model does not allow for choice and refusal of partners and
the emergence of tags. As in our research, Stanley et al. (1994) also study
and IPD game with selective interaction. In their model however, partner
selection is based on a continuously updated expected payoff function and
not on tags (as in our model). The research of Arifovic and Eaton (1995)
focuses on the use of tags as type-signals.
Our work is based on the work of Riolo (Riolo 1997a, Riolo 1997b). Riolo
studied a multi-agent system, modeled by a simple evolutionary algorithm
(EA) in which agents play a short iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game
(of only four rounds) against each other. Under these conditions, it is very
difficult for cooperation to emerge. When Riolo added a simple tagging
mechanism, however, population dynamics changed dramatically and the
agents were able to reach mutual cooperation earlier and over extended
periods of time. However, results in (Riolo 1997a, Riolo 1997b) indicate
that the evolving tag-using populations are still relatively unstable.
Riolo’s pioneering work is extended in this chapter by investigating the
stability of the evolving populations, together with the role of the evolu-
tionary algorithm (EA) that updates the agents’ strategies over time. EAs
are stochastic search methods based on the principles of natural genetic sys-
tems (Mitchell 1996). These algorithms deal with a population of strategies.
The strategies are used by the game-playing agents and determine their be-
haviour in each period of the game. Riolo used a very simple EA in his
experiments. In particular, the reproduction of the strategies was modeled
as an asexual process (i.e., each parent produces one offspring with mutation
as the only genetic operator). This model does not allow for the exchange
of parts of strategies between agents (recombination). This recombina-
tion process may play an important role in the evolutionary search process,
however. Earlier experiments by Axelrod (1987) have demonstrated, for
instance, that cooperative societies form more frequently if recombination
of the agents’ strategies occurs.
Recombination of strategies is also called sexual reproduction. During
this process, well-performing agents (the “parents”) exchange parts of their
strategies to produce offspring. We will show that the sexual reproduction
mechanism has a remarkable stabilizing effect on the evolving populations,
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as compared to asexual reproduction. This monotonicity has as a side effect
that the cooperative populations, on the average, emerge after a longer
period of time than in the asexual case. In previous studies on the IPD
without tagging (Axelrod 1987, Bragt van et al. 2001), it was discussed that
cooperative societies fall down because cooperative agents become naive in
their behaviour after a while (for a definition, see Section 4.2), focusing
on cooperation only, and thus being exploited by defecting agents. In this
chapter, we show that when sexual recombination is used with tagging, most
cooperative agents do not become naive (in contrast with the asexual case),
and that the number of mimics (thus) remains low. This can clarify the
emergence of the stability of cooperation, where the recombination prevents
the emergence of too many naive agents by enabling the exchange of parts
of strategies.
Recombination can be seen as learning parts of other strategies by agents
after periods of interaction (IPD) with other agents. Thus, in a social
setting, our results could indicate that the possibility of learning about
other agents’ strategies prevents cooperative agents from becoming naive
and thus sustains the existing cooperation.
To obtain a speed-up of the emergence of cooperation, we therefore also
consider a natural extension of EAs, incorporating a model for tag-directed
parent (mate) selection. Tag-directed mating replaces the standard (ran-
dom) mating of parents with a more sophisticated matching algorithm, in
which parents can select their own co-parent (based upon exterior mat-
ing characteristics). Results with this extended model already indicate an
increasing number of robust cooperative populations.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we give a brief outline of our
problem in Section 4.2 and our computational experiments in Section 4.3.
Our extension of Riolo’s work is then presented in Section 4.4. The influence
of sexual reproduction is investigated first in Section 4.4.1. Section 4.4.2
then discusses the influence of tag-directed mate selection. In Section 4.4
the two-person IPD is considered. The N-person IPD (NIPD), which is
a more suitable model for the so-called “social dilemmas” (Dawes 1980,
Hardin 1968), is evaluated in Section 4.5. Both Boyd and Richerson (1991)
and Glance and Huberman (1994) have done previous research on the NIPD
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and on social dilemmas. They note that it is difficult to obtain and sustain
cooperation in large groups. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.6.
4.2 Problem description
We investigate the influence of tagging and recombination on the emergence
of cooperation under difficult circumstances. We use the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game (IPD) to model a situation where cooperation is desirable
but difficult to achieve. We study both the two player and the N-player
game. In an IPD game a player can choose to either cooperate or defect.
For the two-player game this means that if both players cooperate they will
receive a reward payoff of R=3, if both players defect they will receive the
punishment payoff P=1. If one player cooperates and the other defects,
the cooperator receives the “sucker’s” payoff S=0, and the defector gets the
temptation payoff T=5. A payoff matrix for the N-player game is shown in
Table 4.3.
We study an evolutionary agent system where agents repeatedly play the
IPD game. The agents in our system have both a tag, a mark that is visible
for the other agents, and a strategy that determines the next action of the
agent based upon some limited memory of the game. The agents decide
with which other agents to play the IPD: when two agents meet and their
tags are sufficiently similar (dependent on the tag-bias of the agent) they
will play an IPD game. The algorithm for tag-based opponent selection is
explained in Section 4.3. We use a population based evolutionary algorithm
(see Chapter 1) to model the evolution and learning of the agents. All
potential solutions are modeled as binary strings; the chromosomes. In our
model the chromosomes contain the agents’ strategies and their tags, which
we further describe in Section 4.3. As usual, the three principal stages
of the evolutionary algorithm are selection, recombination (optional), and
mutation. In the selection stage, well-performing chromosomes are selected
to be the parents of the next generation. This new generation (the offspring)
is then created using recombination and finally a mutation is applied to the
offspring with a small probability.
Finally, we mention some types of agent behaviour. A cooperative agent
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is an agent that reciprocates the cooperation of other agents. We subse-
quently distinguish between naive and discriminating cooperative agents.
A naive agent practically always cooperates. A discriminating agent, such
as for example, Tit-for-Tat (Axelrod 1984), rewards cooperations while pun-
ishing defection.
4.3 Experimental setup
The EA that we implemented consists of a canonical fitness-proportional se-
lection scheme. Three different recombination operators were implemented:
single-point crossover, two-point crossover and uniform crossover (Mitchell
1996). Because we are mainly interested in the relative performance of the
agents, the raw fitness fi (the average payoff over all played rounds) is nor-
malized by taking fˆi = (fi − µ)/σ + 1, where µ is the mean population
fitness (with standard deviation σ). This implies that a player performing
one standard deviation above the mean will (on average) get two offspring.
Negative and very low fitness values (fˆi < 0.1) were reset to 0.1 as in
(Mitchell 1996) so that individuals with a very low fitness still have some
small chance of reproducing.
The representation of the agents’ strategies differs from the representa-
tion Riolo used in his experiments. Here, we use pure (i.e., deterministic)
strategies that are encoded as binary-valued chromosomes, whereas Riolo
used mixed (i.e., probabilistic) strategies that were encoded as real-valued
chromosomes. We adopt the genetic representation of IPD players as pro-
posed by Axelrod (1987). Repeating Riolo’s experiments with this setting
led to similar results. Each agent has a memory capacity of three previous
moves (one move of his own, and two of the opponent) in our model. There
are thus 23 = 8 possible histories and each history uniquely points to an ac-
tion on the strategy part of the chromosome [s0, ...., s7] (see Fig. 4.1), where
cooperate is coded by 1 and defect by 0. Thus, a history of 010=2 will lead
the agent to perform the action specified by strategy bit s2 which is defect.
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Figure 4.1: The structure of an agent’s chromosome when tag-based opponent selection
and mate selection are both used.
Three additional bits [m0, m1, m2] are present on this chromosome that
form an ’artificial pre-game history’ to determine the agents’ first moves.
In the case depicted in Figure 4.1, this means that the agent will begin by
playing cooperate. The initial memory bits are all one (the binary represen-
tation of seven) and thus point to the last strategy bit (s7) will be played
which depicts a 1 and thus means cooperate. Because the IPD game is very
short in our simulations, only four rounds as in (Riolo 1997a), the agents
only have a memory capacity of three previous moves (instead of a memory
of six moves in Axelrod’s 151-round simulations).
An agent’s tag consists of three tag bits [t0, t1, t2] (see Fig. 4.1). We
adopted the same algorithm for tag-based opponent selection as Riolo (1997a).
In this algorithm (see Fig. 4.2) each player can inspect the tag of a limited
number of opponents and tries to find an opponent with a matching tag.
This algorithm will be repeated until ten opponents have been selected from
the population of 400 individuals. An opponent search cost (of 0.02, see Ta-
ble 4.1) is associated with each tag trial. When the allowed number of tag
search trials is exceeded, the player is matched with a random opponent.
After an opponent has been selected, the IPD game is played and the op-
ponent search costs are subtracted from the player’s average payoff. In the
experiments described here, the tag bias, which specifies the maximum al-
lowed Hamming distance between two tags, is set to 0. In this case, the
agent in Fig. 4.1 will only accept opponents with a similar [1,0,1] tag.
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Figure 4.2: The algorithm for tag-based opponent selection.
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The agent’s chromosome, depicted in Fig. 4.1, also has a mate selection tag.
The mate selection mechanism is implemented analogously to the opponent
selection algorithm. After calculating the fitness of all agents in the popu-
lation, a pool of parents is generated (using fitness proportional selection).
Each parent then compares his mate selection tag with the mate selection
tags of other parents in order to find a matching co-parent. When the max-
imum number of mate tag trials is exceeded, the parent will mate with a
randomly selected co-parent. Note that the mate search costs are set equal
to zero (see Table 4.1).
An overview of the model settings is given in Table 4.1. Whenever pos-
sible, similar settings as in (Riolo 1997a) were chosen. Increasing or de-
creasing the mutation rate only had a small influence on the results when
the mutation range was varied between 0.001 and 0.1, a range of commonly
recommended values (Ba¨ck et al. 1997b).
Parameter Value
Number of Agents 400
Population size 400
(Number of strategies)
Number of tag trials 5
Tag size (in bits) 3
Tag bias 0
Opponent search costs 0.02
Mate search costs 0.00
Mutation rate (per bit) 0.025
Crossover probability 0.9/0.0
Number of moves per game 4
Number of games to play 10
Table 4.1: Model settings. We adopted the same terminology as in (Riolo 1997).
The pseudo-code for the evolutionary system is given below. Parameter
settings for the computational model are taken from Table 4.1.
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MAIN
begin
for each agent do (Initialization of the strategies)
create random bitstring od
end
begin
for each generation do
for each agent do
while number of games < number of games to play do
tag-based opponent selection (see function below)
play IPD game
calculate payoffs od
od
apply genetic algorithm (see function below)
od
replace current population with new population
end
TAG-BASED OPPONENT SELECTION
while no opponent has been found do
candidate opponent = select random opponent
if number of searches < max
then
number of searches + +
compare tags
if match then opponent = match fi
fi
if number of searches = max
then
opponent = random opponent
fi
od
end
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GENETIC ALGORITHM
begin
for each agent do
The fitness of an agent is its average payoff over all
the games played
od
end
begin
Scale all fitnesses using sigma-scaling
repeat
do choose two mating parents from the current
population by roulette wheel selection od
do with crossover probability Pcross, cross over
the pair at a randomly chosen point od
(if no crossover takes place, form two offspring that
are exact copies of their respective parents)
do mutate the two offspring at each locus with
probability Pmut od
do place the resulting individuals (chromosomes)
in the new population od
until new population created
end
4.4 Results and discussion
4.4.1 Asexual vs. sexual reproduction
Figure 4.3 shows a typical run of a population of asexual agents playing the
IPD using the settings described in Table 4.1. The oscillatory pattern of the
mean population fitness indicates that the population alternates between a
state of mutual cooperation (when the fitness is close to the reward level
R = 3) and a society of defectors (when the fitness is close to the pun-
ishment level P = 1). Societies of cooperators are frequently undermined
by “mimics”: defecting agents with a tag associated with (a group of) co-
operators. These mimics are not recognized as being defectors and can
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Figure 4.3: Mean fitness of a population of asexual agents playing the IPD. The fluctuations
in fitness show that stable societies of cooperating agents do not form.
therefore successfully exploit the naive cooperating agents (Riolo 1997a),
which emerge as in (Axelrod 1987, Bragt van et al. 2001).
After introducing sexual instead of asexual reproduction, we obtain a
significant change in population dynamics, see Figure 4.4. The oscillatory
behavior visible in Figure 4.3 disappears, and the individual runs can now
be classified as (1) runs in which a high mean fitness level is achieved and
sustained, and (2) runs in which a society of (mainly) defectors forms. Ex-
amples of both cases are shown in Figure 4.4. An important aspect is the
monotonicity of the observed behavior: once cooperation emerges it per-
sists over long periods of time. For instance, we extended some runs for as
long as 10,000 generations without the mean fitness dropping a single time
below the 2.3 level after a cooperative period occurred. A society with co-
operative periods is defined here as a society in which the mean population
fitness remains above 2.3 for 20 successive generations at least once during
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Figure 4.4: Mean fitness of a population of sexual agents playing the IPD: two typical
runs. Notice that the oscillatory behavior observed in Figure 4.3 disappears.
the entire run. Average results (over 30 runs) are presented in Table 4.2.
Asexual Sexual
(two-point) (single-point)
Runs with coop- 0/30 8/30 24/30
erative periods (RCP)
Sustained stable 0/30 8/30 24/30
cooperative runs (RSSC)
Gover2.3 0.59 (0.09) 1.0 (0.0) 1.0 (0.0)
Gunder1.7 0.21 (0.06) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Gto2.3 22 (21) 7.7 · 10
2 2.5 · 102
(7.6 · 102) (2.1 · 102)
Mean histori- 2.24 (0.1) 1.54 (0.5) 1.95 (0.44)
cal fitness (MHF)
Table 4.2: Average fitness performance for asexual experiments and sexual experiments.
(Numbers are calculated for 30 runs of 1,000 generations; standard deviations in brackets.)
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In case of sexual reproduction, the mean fitness over the entire evolution
history (MHF) remains rather low. This is due to the fact that it takes
longer for cooperative societies to emerge when recombination is used. No-
tice for instance in Table 4.2 that, when two-point crossover is used, the
average number of generations it takes before the fitness first exceeds a
value of 2.3, Gto2.3, increases to 7.7 · 10
2 in the experiments with sexual
reproduction. But once a population has exceeded this fitness level, the
population fitness never drops below 1.7 (Gunder1.7=0) and in fact always
remains above 2.3 (Gover2.3=1). Gover2.3 is defined as the fraction of gen-
erations in which the mean fitness is above 2.3, counting only generations
after Gto2.3. Analogously, Gunder1.7 counts the fraction of generations in
which the mean fitness has dropped below 1.7. When one-point crossover
or uniform crossover was used instead of two-point crossover, the same sta-
bilizing effect was observed. However, cooperation was achieved more often
using the less disruptive single-point crossover operator. Populations using
single-point crossover evolved to cooperative societies in 24 out of 30 runs
compared with only 8 out of 30 runs for two-point crossover. The mean fit-
ness increased to 1.95 (0.44) compared with 1.54 (0.5) in case of two-point
crossover (see Table 4.2). In case of uniform crossover, the mean fitness was
only 1.34 (0.33) and cooperative societies emerged in 5 out of 30 runs.
The striking stability of the evolving cooperative societies could firstly be
explained by the influence of sexual reproduction on the number of mim-
ics. Our experiments show that in cooperative societies distinct tagging
groups form, i.e., for each tag one agent type becomes dominant. A mimic
is then defined as an agent with the same tag as the dominating agent type,
but with at least 5 different strategy bits. Defined this way, the propor-
tion of mimics is 20-30 % in the experiments with asexual reproduction.
This large proportion of exploiting agents contributes to the large fluctua-
tions in mean fitness observed in Figure 4.3. The proportion of mimics is
much smaller (below 10 %) in the experiments with sexual reproduction.
This can be further explained by the absence of naive agents. We found that
without recombination, a substantial and increasing part of the cooperating
agents used naive strategies: these naive agents are particularly vulnerable
to exploiting mimics. The number of naive cooperative agents is reduced
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by sexual reproduction: in the experiments with sexual reproduction the
majority of the cooperative agents have (various) discriminating strategies.
Such a majority can be sustained by the recombination operator that allows
parts of the strategies to be included in a new (cooperative) agent. Thus,
the probability of break-down of one of the cooperative tag-groups is sub-
stantially reduced. We remark that, on the other hand, there is always a
larger number of naive cooperators present in the asexual populations: this
can help to achieve a first cooperative (though unstable) group faster in the
asexual case than in the sexual case.
4.4.2 Tag-directed mate selection
Results obtained using the relatively disruptive two-point crossover opera-
tor slightly improved when selective mating was introduced. Mate selection
yields an increase in mean fitness (from 1.54 (0.5) to 1.68 (0.5)), mainly
because, on average, mutual cooperation is discovered earlier (Gto2.3 de-
creases from 7.7 · 102 to 7.2 · 102). Again we found that, once cooperation
was established, average fitness stayed above the 2.3 level. We also per-
formed experiments with an evolving tag bias for mate selection (located
on the chromosome). In this setup, a mate was only accepted if the Ham-
ming distance between the two mating tags was equal to the tag bias. We
found, in general, that agents have a strong preference for partners with a
similar mating tag (the average mate tag bias converged to a small value),
while the average fitness remained the same as in the experiments with a
fixed bias for mate selection.
4.5 Tagging in the N-person IPD game
The two-person IPD game can be used to model many social processes
where cooperation is desirable but not easily obtained or sustained. There
is an important class of cooperation problems, however, which can not be
modeled adequately by the two-person IPD game. These problems are the
so-called social dilemmas (Dawes 1980). Social dilemmas can, however, be
modeled by the N-person IPD (NIPD) game. Therefore, we extend our
research on tagging to the NIPD game. Previous computer simulations of
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the NIPD with evolutionary algorithms (Yao and Darwen 1994) have shown
that it becomes substantially more difficult to evolve cooperative societies if
the number of players increases (i.e., when N > 2). To investigate whether
the tagging mechanism also fosters stable cooperation in the NIPD, we
performed a series of experiments for N > 2.
The NIPD game is described in detail in (Yao and Darwen 1994). Like
in the 2-person IPD, an agent can only choose between cooperation or de-
fection in each round. The payoff (per round) is then determined as follows.
If an agent cooperates, his payoff is equal to 2nc − 2, where nc is the total
number of cooperating agents. If he defects, he earns a payoff of 2nc +1. In
the 4-person IPD this payoff scheme would lead to a payoff of 1 in a society
of defectors and a payoff of 6 in a cooperative society. The payoff matrix
for an agent in the 4-person IPD is shown in Table 4.3.
Number of cooperators among 0 1 2 3
the other N − 1 = 3 players
Cooperates 0 2 4 6
agent A
Defects 1 3 5 7
Table 4.3: Payoff matrix for an agent in the 4-person IPD (Yao 1994)
In our computational model, the strategy of an agent is now depending on
(1) the agent’s previous moves and (2) the number of cooperating agents in
these rounds. If we consider the 4-person IPD, the length of the strategy
block (see Fig. 4.1) is therefore equal to 29= 512 bits (3 bits to denote the
previous 3 moves of the player, and 3 times 2 bits to denote the number of
cooperators in the previous 3 rounds). The initial memory block then also
has a size of 9 bits. As in the previous experiments with the 2-person IPD,
the length of the tag is equal to the size of the initial memory block (i.e.,
9 bits). Without a mating tag, the total chromosome length for agents in
the 4-person IPD is therefore equal to 530 bits. An agent in the 4-person
IPD repeatedly applies the algorithm for tag-based opponent selection as is
shown in Fig. 4.2. The agent is thus allowed 5 tag trails per opponent.
In the evolutionary algorithm, the mutation probability (per bit) is re-
duced to 0.002 (from 0.025, see Table 4.1) to avoid an excessive increase
in the number of mutations due to the much longer chromosome length for
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N = 4. (With this mutation rate, on average one bit per chromosome is
mutated for N = 4 agents.) Values for the remaining parameters were kept
the same as in the 2-person IPD (see Table 4.1).
Computational results for N = 4 are reported in Table 4.4. The degree
and stability of the emerging cooperation is measured by monitoring the
mean historical fitness (MHF), the number of runs with cooperative pe-
riods (RCP), and the number of runs with sustained stable cooperation
(RSSC). Figure 4.5 shows a typical run with asexual reproduction. The
horizontal lines in Fig. 4.5 indicate the mean population fitness for different
values of the number of cooperators nc (accounting for tag search costs).
Notice that it is very difficult to achieve cooperative societies (the MHF
remains low). Although the tagging mechanism increases average fitness
levels, population-wide cooperation does not emerge. Remember that the
average population fitness would still be equal to 2.25 if there is only one
cooperator in each round (i.e., nc = 1, corrected for the tag search costs).
Note from Table 4.4, however, that the number of runs with cooperative
periods (RCP) and the number of runs with sustained stable cooperation
(RSSC) significantly increase in case of tag-using agents.
To gain more insight in the nature of the cooperation that occurs, we
examined the number of cooperators per tag group and in each round of
the game. As in the 2-person IPD, distinct tag groups emerge after ap-
proximately 100 generations. Most of these tag groups exhibit defective
behaviour. Sometimes, however, a tag group discovers cooperative strate-
gies. In most runs, this “cooperating” group was of a substantial size,
periodically increasing average fitness levels to 3 or even higher. The max-
imum fitness measured during the experiments was approximately equal to
5, which indicates the emergence of a large group of cooperators (also given
the fact given that the agents have to pay tag search costs).
The MHF data presented in Table 4.4 suggests that sexual cooperation
does not help the emergence of cooperation. Notice for instance that the
MHF decreases from ≈2.08 in the asexual experiments to ≈1.14 in the
experiments with single-point crossover (when tag use is allowed). A more
careful analysis however shows that the higher mean fitness in the asexual
experiments is due to the fact that in these experiments incidentally a very
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high fitness is achieved. This cooperation level cannot be sustained however.
The experiments further show that (due to slow convergence), fitness levels
in the runs without sexual reproduction decrease very slowly, but once all
cooperation is completely lost, it is very difficult for the asexual agents to
reestablish it (at least not within the 10,000 generations we have examined).
Figure 4.6 shows that this is not the case for experiments with sexual agents:
after an initial period of low fitness levels a transient towards an increased
level of cooperation occurs (after approximately 600 generations). This
increased level of cooperation is then sustained in the remainder of the
experiment.
Sexual reproduction Tags MHF RCP RSSC
No No 1.08 (0.02) 0/30 0/30
(single-point) No 1.11 (0.03) 0/30 0/30
(two-point) No 1.11 (0.02) 0/30 0/30
No Yes 2.08 (0.47) 25/30 3/30
(single-point) Yes 1.14 (0.13) 8/30 4/30
(two-point) Yes 1.62 (0.50) 20/30 14/30
Table 4.4: Influence of tagging and sexual reproduction in the 4-person IPD. Note that
both the mean historical fitness (MHF), the number of runs with cooperative periods
(RCP) and the number of runs with sustained stable cooperation (RSSC) increase if the
agents can use tags. (Statistics are calculated for 30 runs of 10,000 generations; standard
deviations in brackets.)
Sexual reproduction Tags MHF RCP RSSC
No No 6.8 (0.2) 5/10 2/10
(single-point) No 5.7 (0.3) 4/10 2/10
(two-point) No 6.2 (0.2) 5/10 3/10
No Yes 9.5 (2.4) 8/10 4/10
(single-point) Yes 12.9 (1.3) 7/10 7/10
(two-point) Yes 10.6 (1.5) 8/10 8/10
Table 4.5: Experimental results for the 8-person IPD when the number of iterations per
game is increased to 10. Note that the mean historical fitness (MHF) increases when the
use of tags is allowed. (Statistics are calculated for 10 runs of 10,000 generations; standard
deviations in brackets.)
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Figure 4.5: Influence of tagging and asexual reproduction in the 4-person IPD, one typ-
ical run with cooperation. Note the step-wise decrease of fitness as evolution proceeds.
The horizontal lines indicate the fitness of populations with on (average) 1, 2, 3, or 4
cooperators.
When the number of players was increased to 8 or 16 players, only de-
fective societies where observed, with fitness levels always lower than 1.5.
(In the 8-person IPD, the mutation probability is set equal to 0.0002; in the
16-person IPD this probability is set equal to 0.00003) We found in addi-
tional experiments that this difficulty in achieving cooperation was caused
mainly by the small number of rounds (namely 4, see Table 4.1) in the game.
When the game length increases, average fitness levels rise, and cooperation
is achieved more often. As an example, Table 4.5 shows the results for the
8-person IPD when the number of iterations is increased to 10. Remember
that fitness values in the 8-person IPD lie between 1 (for nc = 0) and 14
(for nc = 8). Again we see that tags help to establish cooperation in soci-
eties of agents playing the NIPD. If we look at the population after 10,000
generations we also observe a strong convergence per tag group as was the
case in the 2-person IPD.
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Figure 4.6: Influence of tagging and sexual reproduction in the 4-person IPD. Two typical
runs with cooperation. Notice that, once some cooperation is achieved, the population
stays out of the defective zone throughout the entire run.
In the 16-person IPD, increasing the number of iterations to 10 causes
a small increase of the level of cooperation. In 10 runs of 10,000 genera-
tions each, cooperation (i.e., fitness > 1) emerged only once with tag-using
agents. These results are roughly compatible with experiments from Yao
and Darwen (Yao and Darwen 1994), where no cooperation was found in a
16-person IPD without tags (with 100 iterations and agents with a memory
of size 2). The failure to reach cooperation can be caused by the large search
space (the chromosome length without tags is 32,783 in the 16-person IPD
without tags).
4.6 Conclusions
We have studied evolutionary processes in multi-agent systems. In this
chapter, we have investigated the “evolution of cooperation” in a popula-
tion of agents playing the tag-mediated iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD).
Computational experiments have been performed using evolutionary algo-
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rithms (EAs). We have shown that the tagging mechanism and the repro-
duction process of the agents play a major role in the formation of stable
cooperative societies.
In the 2-person IPD, the population alternates between a state of mutual
cooperation and a society of defectors in a model with asexual reproduction
(i.e., when children are simple copies of their parents and mutation is the
only genetic operator). A distinct behavior emerges if reproduction of the
agents is sexual (i.e., when the parental strategies are recombined during
the reproduction process). We observed, for instance, the formation of very
stable societies of cooperative agents, a phenomenon not observed in the
experiments with asexual reproduction. Furthermore, we found that coop-
erative societies emerge more frequently when the recombination operator
is not too disruptive (e.g., a single-point crossover scheme). Finally, we
proposed a tagging mechanism to enable biased partner selection. Results
for this extended model were presented.
Results for the N-person IPD showed that (1) it becomes more difficult
to evolve cooperative societies if the number of players is increased (i.e., N
> 2), and that (2) tagging does help to achieve cooperation in the N-person
IPD game. Furthermore, stable long-term cooperation emerges more fre-
quently when sexual recombination of the agents’ strategies occurs (as in
the two-person game studied in this chapter). This is due to the fact that
recombination prohibits the emergence of large numbers of naive coopera-
tive strategies and thus reduces the impact and success of mimics. Strategic
information exchange thus helps to build robust strategies, while tagging
creates favorable circumstances for cooperation.
Chapter 5
Agent behavior and interaction in a
trade network
5.1 Introduction
Electronic commerce and trading of information goods significantly impact
the role of intermediaries. Because the services of intermediaries are costly
to consumers, the question arises why intermediaries are necessary. This
question is particularly relevant in electronic commerce where consumers
can decide to buy directly from the producer. Electronic markets facilitate
direct contact between consumers and producers, reducing the influence of
intermediaries. On the other hand, intermediaries may be able to reduce
the information overload consumers face.
The central question of this chapter is whether intermediaries can make a
profit in an information economy. One reason that traditional intermediaries
can make a profit is because they trade a larger volume of goods than the
average consumer and can buy at lower prices. When information goods are
traded over the Internet, however, this advantage disappears. Information
goods differ from traditional goods because they are costly to produce but
cheap to reproduce and there are no natural capacity limits for additional
copies. Therefore pricing structures for information goods are different than
for traditional goods.
One possible role for the intermediary in an electronic market is the
role of search expert—intermediaries are in the market for more periods
of time and make more transactions than individual buyers and sellers.
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Such an intermediary thus gains expertise on where the best deals are to
be found. In the age of information overload, intermediaries that reduce
consumer search costs may be able to make a profit in electronic markets.
We investigate the conditions under which such intermediaries can attract
a customer base. We use evolutionary computer simulations, a method-
ology from the field of agent-based computational economics (ACE) as
in (Tesfatsion 2001, Alkemade and Poutre´ 2002), to study an electronic
trade network where consumers, producers and intermediaries trade an in-
formation good. Agent-based computational economics studies economic
phenomena as they emerge from interactions between individual, bound-
edly rational agents. In our case, we initialize a trade network with a fixed,
user-specified number of consumers, producers and intermediaries. Over
time, the agents in the networks learn which links to form and we study the
trade network that arises from those repeated local decisions.
We use a network economics approach (Shapiro and Varian 1999) to
study electronic trade networks. Network economics holds the view that
individual actions, and in turn aggregate outcomes, are in a large part
determined by the interaction structure (as in ACE). This stands in con-
trast with the market view of the economy where buyers and sellers are
anonymous and the structure of the interaction is typically considered less
important. The network economics view of the economy states that there
must be a connection (an information link) between buyers and sellers in
order for any trade to occur. A connection between two agents means that
there is a flow of relevant information between the two agents (i.e., a buyer
that requests price quotes from a seller or subscribes to a mailing list). If
a buyer does not know about a certain seller that offers the best price, this
price will not influence his purchase decision. Agents trade over the net-
work and buyers have to decide which connections to form to the sellers.
Over time, some connections may yield a higher utility than others and
consumers can decide to update their link pattern. Links are a model for
consumer search behavior and are costly, i.e., the buyer has to invest some
resources (time, money) to find and maintain contact with potential sell-
ers. Buyers make this strategic linking decisions based on the information
they have available. To model this boundedly rational search and learning
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behavior of the consumers we use an evolutionary algorithm.
Section 5.2 describes the trading agents and the economic model. In
Section 5.3 the use of an evolutionary algorithm as a model for agent learn-
ing behavior is explained. A layout of the experimental design is given in
Section 5.4. Section 5.5 provides results for the agent-based simulations we
have performed. In Section 5.6 we study how an intermdeiary can become
an expert. Conclusions will be given in Section 5.7.
5.2 The economic trade network model
We consider a trade network game of cost-minimizing boundedly rational
consumers, and profit-maximizing producers and intermediaries. The goal
of this research is to investigate the influence of the network structure and
information level of the agents on the level of intermediated trade in the
model. Each period of the game consumers buy a single unit of an infor-
mation good, which they can buy directly from the producers or through
an intermediary. Production of information goods involves high fixed but
low marginal costs. In this chapter we assume that initial production costs
are sunk and reproduction is very cheap and easy, therefore we impose no
capacity constraints on the number of goods an individual producer can
supply. Trade can only occur if there is a connection, a link, between a con-
sumer and a seller (producer or intermediary). Buyers (that is, consumers
and intermediaries) strategically decide which links to form by choosing a
linking strategy from their associated strategy base, this strategy base is
periodically updated by an evolutionary algorithm. Producers strategically
decide what prices to charge during a trade period. The trade network
thus consist of consumers, producers, intermediaries and the links connect-
ing them. The model is initialized with a fixed, user-specified number of
consumers, producers, and intermediaries. Figure 5.1 depicts the economic
model and a possible trade network.
We investigate the influence of the initial expertise level of the interme-
diary, that is, the influence of the number of links the intermediary initially
sustains with producers, on the resulting trade network. Well-connected
intermediaries have a better chance of finding the best price than inter-
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Figure 5.1: The model and example of a possible trade network between consumers, pro-
ducers and intermediaries. The trade network is depicted within the dashed square.
mediaries without links. We study the level of intermediation for different
producer price schedules that lead to different market dynamics. Below, a
more detailed description of the different types of economic agents present
in the model will be given. An overview of the evolutionary algorithm that
is used to learn better linking strategies is described in Section 5.3. Each
trade period the flow of goods and information follows the steps depicted
in Figure 5.2. Again this will be described in more detail below.
5.2 The economic trade network model 83
4 3 5 5a
5b
3
4
1
2
Consumers
Producers
Intermediaries
1
2
3
4
5
a
b
to Producer
Request for price quotes from Consumers
Price quotes from Sellers (Producers and
Intermediaries) to Consumers
Consumer purchases good directly from 
Producer, or
Consumer purchases good through
intermediary who
instantly purchases the good from the
Producer
Request for price−quotes from Intermediary 
Price quotes from Producers to Intermediary
to Sellers (Producers and Intermediaries)
TI
M
E
Figure 5.2: Flow of information between Consumers, Producers and Intermediaries in the
trade network model.
5.2.1 Heterogeneous, boundedly rational consumers
Consumers in the trade network are cost minimizing consumers. Each trade
period, a consumer buys a single unit of a homogeneous information good.
Consumers can only buy from a seller they have formed a link to and these
links are costly. Each link has a per unit cost associated with it (in the
current setup these cost are taken constant for all links). The total search
cost (Cs) a consumer incurs during a single trade period is equal to the
number of links (l) he maintains times the search cost per link (cl) (for
parameter values see Table 5.1). The utility of a consumer (Uc) is then
defined as the negative of this total search cost plus the purchase price (P ):
Uc = −(l · cl + P )
Consumers in our model are boundedly rational (Simon 1984, Newell and
Simon 1972), that is, the consumers do not have the information and the
computational capabilities needed to make an optimal decision. To make
a perfectly rational decision, an agent needs to know the exact price each
producer will charge and then form only one link to the producer offering the
lowest price. This is not a realistic scenario since the price depends on the
decisions of other consumers as well. Individual consumers have no direct
84 Agent behavior and interaction in a trade network
information about the behavior of other consumers. This is particularly
true in electronic commerce where shops have no physical location and
consumers do not have access to knowledge about other consumers. The
consumer thus faces a trade-off between the number of costly links he forms
and his utility. More links mean a higher chance of finding the best price
while fewer links mean lower search cost. Furthermore, since we study a
model where producers change their prices over time, the optimal linking
strategy for the consumer can also change. Therefore the consumer has to
learn by trial and error (experience) which link patterns yield higher utility.
A consumer’s strategy determines his search behavior (which links he forms
and maintains). This strategy is learned and adapted by an evolutionary
algorithm. The fitness of a search strategy is equal to the utility that
particular strategy yielded for the consumer.
The search strategy thus determines how many and which links a con-
sumer forms to producers and intermediaries. The boundedly rational con-
sumer then buys the product from his cheapest linked seller. However, with
a small error probability  the consumer purchases the information good
from a randomly chosen seller. This reflects the fact that the consumer
may make a mistake in selecting the cheapest seller or that the physical
(Internet) connection with his preferred seller may fail. Search thus occurs
at two levels; search over a link to find the best price quote and search at a
more abstract level to find the best search strategy (the EA). The algorithm
for the consumers is as follows:
Each trade period consumers take the following steps:
Step 1. Decide which links to form to sellers
Step 2. Choose preferred seller:
With probability 1−  (where  is small)
Preferred seller is the linked seller offering the lowest price
Or, with probability 
Preferred seller is a randomly selected linked seller
Step 3. Buy the good from the preferred seller
Step 4. Calculate utility: − (price + total search cost)
Step 5. Update link strategy
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5.2.2 Heterogeneous adaptive producers
At the beginning of each trade period, a producer has to decide which price
to charge during that period. The prices set by the producers are the driving
force behind the dynamics of the trade network. There are no capacity
constraints for the producers since we are dealing with an information good.
We investigate two basic adaptive price schedules, where producers adjust
their prices on the basis of economic results from the previous period.
First, we consider the case where producers use a downward sloping
price demand curve (Mas-Colell et al. 1995) where price decreases as
demand increases. Naive expectations are used to update beliefs about
expected demand: Demand exp(t) = Demand(t − 1). Expected demand
for the first trade period is chosen randomly from a uniform distribution
[0..number of consumers]. Hence, producers have heterogeneous expecta-
tions about demand. In this scenario the sellers use a basic price setting
mechanism and do not recognize any market power they may have. Since
producers charge the lowest price when demand is high, this price schedule
presents a coordination problem to the buyers. Buyers are best off if they
all form one and only one link to the same producer. We could think of a
good that exhibits network effects (software).
Production of information goods involves high fixed, but low marginal
costs. Some economists (Choi et al. 1997) argue that such a cost struc-
ture requires a pricing schedule where information goods are priced ac-
cording to consumer value. We therefore investigate a second pricing sce-
nario where producers continually try to increase their profits. Producers
use a so-called derivative follower (DF) algorithm—see (Greenwald and
Kephart 1999, DiMicco et al. 2001)—to determine their prices. The DF al-
gorithm is a (local) search algorithm that dynamically adjusts the price for
the offered good based on observed profits. This algorithm starts at some
user-specified price level (in our case randomly drawn) and then, step-by-
step, changes the price in the same direction until the current profit drops
below the profit obtained in the previous trading period. In that case, the
search direction is reversed and steps in the other direction are made. Ev-
ery time the profit decreases the search direction is reversed again. The
direction of change is randomly set to −1 or 1 at the beginning of the simu-
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lation. Similarly, the initial price is randomly chosen from a uniform distri-
bution [minimum price,maximum price] (heterogeneous producers). This
algorithm is able to react very quickly to changes in the profit landscape.
Two additional advantages of the DF algorithm are that the underlying idea
of the DF is very intuitive and that the DF requires very little problem spe-
cific knowledge. The derivative follower algorithm leads to more complex
price dynamics than the downward sloping price demand curve described
above, so the search problem for consumers is more complex. The algorithm
for the producers is as follows (for an overview of parameter values used in
the experiments see Table 5.1):
Each trade period producers take the following steps:
Scenario 1: Producers using a downward sloping demand curve
Step 1 Calculate expected demand,
using: Demandexp(t) = Demand(t− 1)
Step 2 Determine Price P,
using P = a− (b ∗Demandexp(t))
Step 3 Sell the good to buyers
Step 4 Calculate actual demand (Demand(t))
Scenario 2: Producers using the derivative follower algorithm
Step 1 If the profits in the previous period are smaller
than profits in the previous period
Then reverse direction of price adjustment (dpa)
Step 2 Determine Price P,
using: P = Pold ∗ (1 + (dpa ∗ stepsize))
Step 3 Sell the good to buyers
Step 4 Calculate actual profit
5.2.3 Profit maximizing intermediaries
We investigate whether intermediaries that are experts at searching can ex-
ists and make a profit in an electronic trade network when consumers can
also buy directly from the producers. To gain more insight in the role of
such intermediaries we vary the level of knowledge or expertise that inter-
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mediaries have about the trade network and test whether they are able to
attract customers. Intermediaries buy goods from producers and sell them
to consumers. Intermediaries charge consumers a percentage (markup) of
the acquisition price, so that they can make a profit. Profit equals the total
number of goods sold to consumers times the markup percentage minus the
total link cost of the intermediary. Intermediaries can buy and sell more
than one unit of the homogeneous product during a single trade period.
On the consumer-side intermediaries function like the consumers described
above. That is, they have a search strategy that is periodically updated by
an evolutionary algorithm. The fitness of a search strategy is equal to the
profit the intermediary obtained using that strategy. We assume that the
intermediary only buys a product if there is a consumer he will sell it to (no
stocks). The intermediary thus acts as a broker. Price quotes remain valid
for the entire trade period. If an intermediary receives an attractive price
quote from a producer he can purchase the information good instantly when
a consumer arrives that is willing to buy the product at the price quoted
by the intermediary. The algorithm for the intermediaries is as follows:
Each trade period intermediaries take the following steps:
Step 1 Decide which links to form to sellers
Step 2 Determine Price,
using: P = Acquisition Price ∗ (1 + markup),
Acquisition Price is the price from the
linked seller offering the lowest price
Step 3 Calculate profit (number of units sold ∗ markup)
Step 4 Update link strategy
To model the fact that the intermediary may (initially) have expert knowl-
edge about the trade network and can use this knowledge to make a profit,
we vary the initial network density of the intermediary (the number of links
to producers that the intermediary sustains initially). When the intermedi-
ary has complete knowledge about the trade network, he maintains links to
all producers. An initial network density of 0.6 means that at the beginning
of the simulation the intermediary maintains links to (and can obtain price
quotes from) sixty percent of the producers.
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5.2.4 Market dynamics
Market dynamics are driven by the prices set by producers. At each timestep
of the model, the agent actions described above are executed resulting in the
model sequence described below. Initially, the number of producers, con-
sumers and intermediaries are chosen, as well as the initial network density
(expertise levels) of the intermediaries. The outcome of the evolutionary
agent-based simulation now depends on those initial conditions and the
agent-interactions.
Each trade period the economic agents take
the following steps:
1. Producers choose their prices
2. Intermediaries form links to producers based on their search strategy
3. Intermediaries choose their prices
4. Consumers form links to sellers based on their search strategy
5. Consumers buy 1 unit of the good from their preferred linked seller
6. Consumers calculate their utility
7. Consumer search strategies are updated by the EA
8. Intermediaries calculate their profits
9. Intermediary search strategies are updated by the EA
10. Producers calculate their profits
11. Producers update their prices for the next period
5.3 Agent learning
To model the learning and search behavior of the evolutionary agents we
use an multi-population evolutionary algorithm (EA), see Chapter 1. A
schematic overview of the model is given in Figure 5.1. There are three
groups of economic agents present in the model: consumers, producers and
intermediaries. There are different types of consumer agents. In the current
setup agent types are heterogeneous with respect to the strategies they use.
Different agent types select their strategies from a different strategy base.
When a consumer of a certain type chooses a strategy, he picks a strategy out
of the associated strategy base. The strategy base of a particular consumer
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type is periodically updated by an evolutionary algorithm. It can therefore
happen that agents of a certain type prefer direct trade while other agent
types trade through the intermediary. Similarly, each intermediary type
draws strategies from a different strategy base.
5.4 Experimental design
The goal of the experiments is to investigate how the initial expertise level
of the intermediary influences the level of intermediation. We vary the
initial level of expertise of the intermediary—the number of links the inter-
mediary initially maintains to producers—and study the evolution of the
trade network over several trade periods. We thus perform an agent-based
computational study of an electronic trade network modeled as an evolv-
ing system of autonomous interacting agents. The resulting trade network
and network dynamics are a result of the local interactions of autonomous
agents over time.
The model described above allows us to investigate the role of the inter-
mediary in electronic trade networks where consumers can choose to buy
directly from the producer or through the intermediary. The experiments
are conducted under different conditions concerning the pricing mechanism
for the information good and the level of expertise of the intermediary.
The services of the intermediary are costly and a rational consumer with
perfect information would therefore prefer to buy directly from the pro-
ducer. However, in our model it is costly to find the cheapest producer,
i.e., the consumer has to invest some resources (time or money) to find
a good deal. An intermediary with a good network may be able to take
over the search function from the consumer and make a profit. For a con-
sumer there is no visible difference between buying from the intermediary
or buying directly from the producer. In this chapter we do not assume
that intermediaries are more trustworthy than producers: the only way in-
termediaries can make a profit is if they are better at finding the cheapest
producer than the consumers. To model the fact that the intermediary may
have expert knowledge about the trade network and can use this knowledge
to make a profit, we vary the initial network of the intermediary. In all
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simulations, the consumer network is initialized with a density of 0.2. This
means that the average consumer initially has links to twenty percent of the
sellers (producers and intermediaries). We then introduce intermediaries in
the market and the initial network density of the intermediary varies from
0.2 (no difference in knowledge between intermediaries and consumers) to
1.0 (complete knowledge about the market for the intermediary). Table 5.1
gives an overview of the parameter settings used in the experiments. We
have performed a sensitivity analysis on the parameter values and found
that results are robust for different parameter settings. Furthermore, we
have performed 25 runs of each parameter configuration used. The results
that are shown in the next section are averages over 25 runs. All experi-
ments were initialized with 10 producers, 40 consumers and 1 intermediary.
As described above the expertise level of the intermediary and the pricing
mechanism of the producers were varied during the experiments.
We have developed an agent-based simulation environment for testing
and visualization of electronic trade networks. A screen shot of one of the
output windows of the system is given in Figure 5.3. The system displays
the architecture of the trade network at a certain point in time as well as the
links that were used to purchase the good. On the right a graph monitoring
average consumer utility is shown. All economic and EA parameters can be
adjusted by the user, the system can also run in batch mode allowing for
more extensive simulations and statistical analysis of the results. Agent-
based simulation makes it possible to investigate many new scenarios that
may arise as electronic commerce increases. Agent-based computational
economics studies economic phenomena as they emerge from interactions
between individual, boundedly rational agents. Simulations can give us
valuable insights in the market structures that will arise. The simulations
discussed in this chapter are a first step in that direction.
5.5 Results and discussion
5.5.1 Producers with a downward sloping price demand curve
The price structure used by the producers in this scenario presents a co-
ordination problem to the consumers. Consumers get the lowest price if
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Parameter Value
Economic model parameters
Producers
Number of Producers 10
Maximum price 12.0
Minimum price 0.0
Producer price setting mechanism
Downward sloping demand curve P = a− b ∗Demandexp
a 12
b 0.3
Derivative follower P = P ∗ (1 + (dir ∗ step size))
direction {−1, 1}
step size 0.1
Consumers
Number of Consumers 40
Number of Consumer Types 10
Link costs 1
Error constant  0.05
Initial network density consumers 0.2
Intermediaries
Number of Intermediaries 1
Link costs 1
Initial network density intermediaries 0.2...1.0
Intermediary markup 5%
EA parameters
EA Simple GA
Mutation rate 0.02 per bit
Crossover rate 1.0
Size of strategy base/population size 20
Table 5.1: Economic parameter values for consumers, producers and intermediaries and
the evolutionary algorithm parameter values.
they all purchase the information good from the same producer. The effi-
cient (efficiency here refers to minimum cost or maximum profit) outcome
occurs when all consumers maintain one and only one link to the cheapest
producer. When a producer has succeeded in attracting a customer base
of a certain threshold size, he keeps attracting new customers because he
offers the lowest price. Furthermore, when the consumers have solved the
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of the simulation environment.
coordination problem there is no incentive to change their strategy, or even
to maintain outside options, so the structure of the trade network as well
as the price dynamics stabilize. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate these effects.
Figure 5.4 shows average consumer utility for different levels of the initial
expertise level of the intermediary. The figure shows that consumer utilities
are highest when no intermediaries are present in the market. The frac-
tion of sales that occurs through the intermediary is plotted in Figure 5.5.
As the intermediary starts off with a better network he attracts more con-
sumers. However, the intermediary is not able to maintain this competitive
advantage. This is caused by the fact that at the beginning of the simula-
tion there is a lot of variance and uncertainty—prices vary, search strategies
are not yet learned and demand is greatly dispersed. It is not yet obvious
which producer will ‘win’ (path-dependent). Under these circumstances,
the intermediary presents an attractive alternative. When price dynamics
stabilize, it becomes easier for the consumers to find a good strategy and
most consumers learn that they can obtain higher utility by direct trade
instead of intermediated trade.
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Figure 5.4: Averages consumer utilities over 25 runs for 40 update cycles of the evolutionary
algorithm. Results are given for different initial expertise levels of the intermediary.
A comparison of Figure 5.4 and 5.5 reveals that the increase in average
consumer utility coincides with a decrease in intermediary activity. This
is an indicator that the intermediary increases market inefficiency. Av-
erage consumer utility increases over time, which demonstrates that the
evolutionary algorithm generates strategies that solve the consumer coor-
dination problem and learn to bypass the intermediary. Note that even
when the quality of the initial network of the intermediary is equal to the
quality of the consumer network, the intermediary still has some market
share. This is caused by the randomness in the system; consumers make
mistakes, and not all newly generated search strategies are an improvement.
The experiments using these price structure show that consumers are able
to find the optimal solution when dynamics are simple. Furthermore, under
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these conditions intermediaries are not part of an efficient market structure.
However, when prices fluctuate, intermediaries are a stabilizing factor and
are able to attract some customers. These effects of consumer learning can
be observed even when initially all consumers have a link to the intermedi-
ary, see Figure 5.6. The experiments conducted using the derivative follower
algorithm are described below.
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5.5.2 Producers using the derivative follower pricing algorithm
Price dynamics caused by the derivative follower (DF) algorithm are more
complex than the price dynamics discussed above. Producers continually
seek to increase their profits by adjusting prices. The consumers now face
a different problem, a trade off between the number of links they maintain
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and their total utility, so it is no longer optimal in the long run to maintain
just one link. In this scenario a buyer may want to have several trade
possibilities, so he can switch when his current supplier raises his price. The
results of the experiments are given below. Figure 5.7 shows the average
consumer utility when producers use a DF pricing strategy, while Figure 5.8
plots the fraction of sales that occur through the intermediary. Like in
the experiments described above, we see that the fraction of intermediated
sales increases when the quality of the initial network of the intermediary
increases. However, this does not coincide with lower average consumer
utility (see Table 5.2). In fact, consumer utility remains fairly constant
after an initial training period. This indicates that there is a profitable niche
for the intermediary and that intermediaries can play a role in an efficient
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market structure. If we take a closer look at the trade patterns that arise, we
see that the intermediary takes over the search function from the consumers
(during the turbulent initial part of the simulation) at the cost of a slightly
higher price. Initially consumers try to form and maintain many links to
different producers (network density increases from 0.2 to 0.5) but after
10 generations many consumers maintain only a link to the intermediary.
After 20 generations the fraction of intermediated sales decreases again and
consumers learn high utility strategies for direct trade.
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Figure 5.7: Averages consumer utility over 25 runs when producers use a derivative follower
pricing strategy. Results are given for different initial expertise levels of the intermediary.
Again we see that the same effect still occurs if initially all consumers
have a link to the intermediary, see Figure 5.9.
These experiments show that expert intermediaries can provide a valu-
able service to consumers when search costs are high. Furthermore, their
activities have a stabilizing effect on price dynamics and the structure of
the resulting trade network. However, the intermediary has to invest in
a high quality network in order to attract customers. As market dynam-
ics stabilize it becomes easier for consumers to find a good search strategy
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Expert level Fraction of Average Consumer
Intermediary Intermediated Sales Utility
no intermediary 0 0.89 (0.05)
0.2 0.03 (0.04) 0.89 (0.05)
0.4 0.09 (0.03) 0.89 (0.05)
0.6 0.10 (0.06) 0.89 (0.04)
0.8 0.19 (0.08) 0.89 (0.05)
1.0 0.25 (0.10) 0.89 (0.04)
Table 5.2: Averages over 25 runs of 40 generations when producers use a derivative follower
pricing strategy
and bypass the intermediary. This even happens when initially all con-
sumers have a link to the intermediary, as illustrated in Figure 5.9. That
is consumers learn to bypass the expensive intermediary as they learn more
about the structure of the market through experience. Electronic markets
for information goods are characterized by frequent price changes, hence we
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Figure 5.9: Averages fraction of sales by the intermediary over 25 runs when producers
use a derivative follower pricing strategy and all consumers initially have a link to the
intermediary. Results are given for different initial expertise levels of the intermediary.
expect that specialized search intermediaries will play a role in electronic
trade networks. The fact that intermediaries can occupy a greater niche in
the market when uncertainty is high, is confirmed if we consider random
production in Section 5.5.3.
5.5.3 Random production
The effect of uncertainty in the market on the level of intermediated trade
can be clearly illustrated by looking at the situation where production is
random, see Figure 5.10. Here we see that well connected intermediaries
are able to obtain and maintain a substantial market share.
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5.6 Learning to become an expert intermediary
In the previous sections we have investigated the conditions under which
expert intermediaries can obtain a market share in markets where consumers
can also choose to buy directly from producers at a lower cost. The expertise
of the intermediary was reflected by the fact that the intermediary has a
better knowledge of the market than the average consumer. In this section
we consider how an intermediary might gain such expertise. According
to Spulber (1999) one reason why intermediaries have better knowledge
than the average consumer is the fact that they simple perform much more
transactions and thus have an increased opportunity to learn about the
market. In order to test this hypothesis we have increased the learning rate
(lr) of the intermediary, that is the strategy base of the intermediary is now
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updated more often than the strategy base of the consumers. Figure 5.11
presents the results for this model with learning rate 4 for the intermediaries
and learning rate 1 for consumers.
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First we note that the intermediaries are able to obtain a higher market
share than in the previous section although the same overall tendency can
be observed (decreasing intermediary market share as the trade simulation
continues). However, if we look at the individual runs this is no longer true.
Without fast intermediary learning, all runs were similar, as is demonstrated
by the low standard deviations in Table 5.2. When intermediaries have
a higher learning rate than consumers this is no longer the case. More
specifically, we find that in 20-25% of all runs intermediaries are able to
obtain and maintain a substantial niche in the market. Two such runs are
depicted in Figure 5.12. These results show that higher expertise levels of
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the intermediary can indeed be explained by a faster learning rate for those
intermediaries.
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Figure 5.12: Two examples of individual runs where intermediaries succeed in obtaining
and maintaining a substantial market share.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have addressed the question whether intermediaries will
still exist and be able to make a profit if consumers can make direct con-
nections with producers, as is often the case in electronic commerce. We
have performed agent-based simulations to study the performance of in-
termediaries under different market conditions. We modeled an electronic
trade network where an information good is traded over the network. Each
trade period cost-minimizing consumers have to decide which links to form
to sellers (i.e., producers and intermediaries), while the good can only be
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purchased if a link between the buyer and the seller exists. Links thus rep-
resent trading possibilities, a flow of relevant information (i.e., price quotes
in our case between potential buyers and sellers) and the consumers have
to make a strategic decision about which (costly) links to form. We have
used an evolutionary algorithm to model the search and learning behavior
of the buyers. Our main finding is that if market dynamics are sufficiently
complex, intermediaries that have better knowledge about the market than
the average consumer are initially able to increase their market share and
make a profit.
In accordance with the theory our simulation showed that ultimately
most consumers bypass the intermediary if direct trade is more profitable.
We have investigated the conditions under which intermediaries can still
make a profit and simulated different scenarios. Based on our simulation
we can make the following observations. Intermediaries that are experts at
finding the best price quotes can initially survive (and even increase their
market share) in an electronic trade network where consumers can also form
direct links to producers, although ultimately most consumers bypass the
intermediary if direct trade is more profitable. However, when producers
change their prices in an adaptive way to increase their profits (derivative
follower) consumers face a trade-off between maintaining many costly links
and getting the best price. In those types of markets there is a profitable
niche for the intermediary and we find that many consumers choose to trade
through the intermediary. Consumers compensate for the higher purchase
price by maintaining less links—this has a stabilizing effect on the architec-
ture of the electronic trade network. And finally, the expertise levels of the
intermediary can be explained by the fact that intermediaries learn faster
than consumers because they perform more transactions.
These findings suggest that intermediaries will still be needed when con-
sumers trade on complex dynamic electronic trade networks. Agent-based
simulation thus makes it possible to investigate many new scenarios that
may arise as electronic commerce increases. Simulations can give us valu-
able insights in the market structures that will arise.
Chapter 6
Diffusion of information on a social
network
6.1 Introduction
Network economics holds the view that individual actions and, in turn ag-
gregate outcomes, are in large part determined by the interaction structure
between heterogeneous economic agents. The structure of the social net-
work between agents is particularly relevant if we consider the market for
so-called fashion goods, i.e., products for which consumer value depends
strongly on the consumption decisions of others. For the diffusion of such
fashions, “word of mouth” plays an important role, consumers tell each
other about the product and with that it gains popularity. Firms operating
in such a market need to take the properties of the social network between
consumers into account when they make marketing decisions.
The central question of this chapter is whether firms can learn about
social network structure and consumer characteristics when only limited
information is available, and use this information to evolve a succesful mar-
keting strategy. We consider the decision problem of a firm that wishes to
choose an advertising strategy to successfully introduce a new product in
a network of consumers. Consumers base their purchase decision on the
behaviour of other consumers. It may be of critical importance for this firm
to get insights into the structure of the social network. However, market-
ing research charting consumer relations is typically expensive and difficult
to perform. We investigate whether firms can learn targeted advertising
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strategies, taking the social network structure into account if only aggre-
gate sales data are available. Is such a strategy of targeted advertising more
effective than a random advertising strategy? And does the best strategy
change with respect to different topologies of networks? To address these
question we use insights from the existing literature on diffusion phenom-
ena in networks, both in economics and epidemiology. We extend existing
models to allow for more realistic modeling of consumer behaviour and we
study the diffusion of the innovation through agent-based simulation.
The simulation model allows us to study how word of mouth about an
innovation (i.e., a new product or idea) spreads throughout a social net-
work. More specifically, we look at the situation where the decisions of the
consumers are strongly determined by the decisions of their neighbors in
the network. There are two major situations in which this type of behav-
ior can be considered a good strategy for consumers. First, when agents
do not possess any reliable information about the new good, they look at
the consumers around them as a way to extract information. Some of the
other consumers may hold private information about the new good or sim-
ply, in the case of a dynamic setting, they may have purchased the good
already and then inform the people to whom they are connected . Second,
consumers may in fact assign a relatively low weight to the actual charac-
teristics of the good itself and instead attach a higher value to the number
of people purchasing the good.
The rest of the chapter dicusses the details of our model and a discussion
of obtained results. Section 6.2 provides an overview of the relevant litera-
ture. Section 6.3 describes the model used for our agent-based simulations.
The experimental setup is described in Section 6.4. Results are given in
Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 draws conclusions.
6.2 Relation to existing literature
The literature on social interactions has throughly studied how a preference
for conformity can explain herd behavior in consumers or the emergence
of fashion, fads and customs, see (Banerjee 1992, Brock and Durlauf 1997,
Bikhchandani et al. 1992, Bernheim 1994). The diffusion of a new product,
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or innovation in a network, often follows a gradual pattern. In a first stage a
few consumers (the innovators or early adopters) adopt, then consumers in
contact with them adopt, then consumers in contact with those consumers
adopt, and so forth until the innovation possibly spreads throughout the net-
work reaching also the more conservative consumers (or ‘followers’). When
the diffusion reaches the majority of the network, we call this a cascade.
Such a cascade is associated with the commercial success of the new prod-
uct. If innovation does not succeed in completely taking off, the firm may
decide to file the product as a failure. Thus, we explore whether or not the
new product diffuses to the largest part of the network together with the
time actually needed for the critical diffusion.
The initial positive feedback mechanism described above, may be off-
set by a tendency of some consumers to distinguish themselves from the
dominant tendency. A form of negative externality may then make a few
individuals revise their purchasing decision with the effect of limiting the
diffusion of the innovation to the entire system. In this paper we will study
both positive and negative feedback. We explicitly take into account that
the consumption behavior of other people can have a positive externality
(‘people like to imitate other people’), but also negative feedback (‘people
like to be special’). One way for these two opposing forces to co-exist is to
have ‘imitation effects’ being replaced by a tendency towards heterogeneity
as soon as some critical level of diffusion of the product is attained.
A further useful distinction in the study of consumption behavior con-
cerns the intrinsic purchasing attitude of consumers. Some may be con-
sidered ‘innovative’ consumers. They are the ones who first choose a new
product and are basically responsible for its initial diffusion. Innovators
usually represent a small portion of the set of consumers. Most people
are instead simply ‘followers’, in that their strategy is to choose the novel
good only after someone else has already tried it. Their strategy is a more
conservative one and they are usually responsible for the actual spread of
the innovation. These two consumption attitudes have both been shown
to play a role in the diffusion processes of many products. One example
is new software products (Hippel von 1988), which are usually tried by a
restricted group of experimental users and later, eventually, chosen by a
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higher number of more conservative consumers. In our model we allow for
different consumer purchasing attitudes.
Advertising campaigns are costly and different strategies can be employed
by the firms. Firms are boundedly rational and are not fully aware of the
structure of the communication channels among consumers. We consider
the situation where firms only have aggregate sales data. This can be an
example for products that are sold over the Internet (for example ringtones)
where the firms do not have any information about the characteristics of
the consumers. Figure 6.1 illustrates how the topology of the network may
ifluence marketing strategies. A so-called ’Star Network’ (see Figure 6.1) is
easiest to penetrate for the firm. If the firm targets the center of the star,
word of mouth about the product reaches all agents in the network very
fast. The most difficult network for the firm is the regular network, where
pathlengths are very long (Figure 6.1). However, if consumers differ in
their tendency to adopt new products there is a trade-off between targeting
consumers that are well connected (such as the center of a star) versus
targeting consumers that have certain characteristics, such as for example
the ‘opinion leaders’ in Valente and Davis (1999). Our model allows us to
investigate this trade off and analyze good advertising strategies for the firm
under different circumstances regarding both the social network topology
and consumer characteristics.
A: Star Network B: Regular Network
Figure 6.1: A Star Network (left) and a Regular Network (right)
Next, we relate our model to the recent literature on diffusion in networks
and we provide a few empirical examples that we want to study. Mod-
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els of informational cascades analyze how the decisions of first movers in
a sequential decision problem can lead to herd behavior (a cascade) of the
whole system of agents, see Banerjee (1992). Herd behavior occurs when
agents do not use any private information but instead only value the in-
formation provided by the decisions taken by the other agents. It should
be noted that in these models, decisions are made sequentially, so that
agents look at the actions taken by the agents who decided before them.
In this chapter we take a different perspective and analyze the diffusion
of information in networks of consumers, as in Watts (2002). A number
of economic models exist, that investigate how innovations diffuse in social
networks (Ellison 1993, Brock and Durlauf 1997, Young 2003). The focus is
on local interactions and in particular on positive feedbacks. An exception is
the work of Cowan et al. (1997) were negative externalities are also consid-
ered, but in their model the influence of the topology of the social network
is not investigated. Famous studies have been concerned with studying the
choice between competing technologies, the specific properties of ‘network
technologies’ entailing compatibility issues and the local self-reinforcement
processes that allow rapid dominance of some new standard or product or
institution (Arthur 1994, David 1985, Katz and Shapiro 1985).
Most of the cited theoretical contributions consider regular lattices, de-
fined as symmetric structures where all nodes have the same ‘degree’, i.e.
the same number of links departing from each node. Instead, empirical
evidence suggests that the degree distribution in social networks is highly
right skewed. Specifically, social networks often display the properties of
small-world graphs. As originally defined in (Watts and Strogatz 1998),
these networks are obtained from regular lattices by rewiring randomly cho-
sen edges. In another version (Newman and Watts 1999), they are graphs
whose vertices are connected together in a regular lattice, with the addic-
tion of a small number of connections bridging randomly chosen vertices.
Small-world graphs show a higher level of clustering than random graphs.
Their pattern is not as ordered as in a regular lattice, but they preserve
short average path lengths, proportional to the logarithm of system size.
Small-world networks are thought to be a good model for many types of
real social networks.
108 Diffusion of information on a social network
Many analytical results for diffusion phenomena on networks are avail-
able from the epidemiological literature that studies the influence of the
topology of the underlying network of individuals on the dynamics of dis-
ease propagation, see for example (Strogatz 2001). These models actually
correspond to percolation problems on graphs. Specifically, they investi-
gate threshold values for actual epidemic outbursts as opposed to limited
localized spreading. Some models (Callaway et al. 2000) also explore the ef-
fectiveness of vaccination strategies that try to inactivate some of the nodes
in the network. One limitation to the application of the mentioned exact
solutions is that they are valid for very large networks, but they do not
hold for small networks. They also require rather strict assumptions, see
(Moore and Newman 2000) for a definition of the general site and bond
percolation problem. There are some analytical results on models of diffu-
sion on networks, see for example (Newman 2000). However, as the agents
become more complex and we introduce a firm with a slightly more sophis-
ticated advertising strategy, results soon become intractable. Therefore, we
use an agent-based model to simulate the information and product diffusion
process.
6.3 The diffusion model
We consider the diffusion of an innovation over a network of consumers. The
goal of this research is to investigate whether a firm can learn directed adver-
tising strategies that increase the size and speed of the diffusion. Consumer
valuation for the product depends only on the fraction of its neighbours
that has already purchased the innovation. The consumers are connected
through a social network and the innovation spreads through this consumer
network. Furthermore, the firm that is pushing the product can advertise
and thus inform consumers about the existence of the product, however
advertising is costly and firms can only target a limited number of con-
sumers. Therefore firms have to learn advertising strategies that will cause
the most effective diffusion of the product. Figure 6.2 gives an overview
of the simulation model, the components will be discussed in more detail
below.
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Figure 6.2: Outline of the simulation model. In this example the consumers are connected
through a small world network structure.
6.3.1 Consumers
In this chapter we look at products for which the consumer value depends
strongly on the number of other consumers that use the product. If con-
sumer value increases when the number of other consumers that has adopted
the innovation becomes larger we call this positive (network) external-
ities, see for example Katz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1986).
Negative (network) externalities occur if consumer value decreases as
number of adopters becomes larger. In this chapter we investigate both pos-
itive and negative externalities. For example, if we consider fashion goods
it might be unrealistic to assume that the positive externality continues to
grow until all consumers use the product. Consumers may have a desire to
be fashionable on the one hand, while they also want to be special on the
other hand, this is particularly true for the innovator who always adopts
the latest fashion or fad. These innovators may move on to the next fashion
while more conservative consumers are still following a previous hype. To
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be more precise, we also investigate the situation where the innovation is
no longer attractive once it becomes adopted by too many people.
A consumer is characterized by its exposure threshold (et) and by its
neighbors. These threshold and the structure of the social network are exo-
geneously given at the start of the simulation. Consumer that have already
adopted the innovation talk about it to their neighbours, so consumers are
aware of the purchase decisions of other consumers they are linked to. The
exposure threshold models the tendency of a consumer to adopt the new
product. A consumer with an exposure threshold of 0.5 will buy the prod-
uct if and only if at least half of its neighbors have also bought the product.
Note that this threshold is more easily reached in sparse (but connected)
networks than in dense networks. In Section 6.5.4 we also consider nega-
tive externalities, that is consumers want to be fashionable but still special.
In this case consumers have both an exposure threshold (et) and an over-
exposure threshold (oet) threshold. Consumers stop using the product if the
fraction of their neighbors that has adopted the product exceeds their over-
exposure threshold. This over-exposure threshold is used by the agents to
discriminate between innovations that are attractive and innovations that
are no longer fashionable because their user-base has become too large. The
decision rule for the consumer can be characterized as follows:
Each trade period consumers take the following steps:
1. Consumers who have already adopted the innovation
talk about the product to their neighbors
2. A Consumer decides to adopt the product if:
Word of mouth it receives from its neighbors
exceeds its Exposure Threshold.
and (in case of negative externalities)
Word of mouth it receives from its neighbors
does not exceed its Over-Exposure Threshold.
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6.3.2 Firms
Firms can engage in an advertising campaign in order to try and increase the
size and the speed of the diffusion of their product (the innovation). Firms
do not have any a priori knowledge about the structure of the consumer
network and have to learn which advertising strategies are best. They have
to choose which consumers to target in order to ensure fast diffusion of their
new product. Advertising campaigns are costly and different strategies can
be employed. Firms are boundedly rational and are not fully aware of the
structure of the communication channels among consumers. As a result,
they are likely to explore a range of targeted advertising strategies. To
model this search and learning process of the firms we use a simple genetic
algorithm which will be described in more detail below. An advertising
strategy specifies which consumers are targeted at time 0. The success of
an advertising strategy depends on (1) the number of consumers that have
adopted the innovation after a specified period of time when that strategy
was used, and (2) the cost of the advertising campaign. The number of
products sold is the only information coming from the market that the firm
obtains at the end of each period. The algorithm used by the firms can be
summarized as follows:
Firms take the following steps:
1. Select an advertising strategy
2. Calculate fitness of the strategy:
Fitness = Sales - Advertising costs
3. Update Strategies:
Update strategy base using a GA
4. Go to 1.
We investigate the learning capabilities of the firms with respect to two
scenarios. First we examine whether firms can learn the best directed ad-
vertising strategy when a fixed number of consumers is targeted, i.e., the
firm has a fixed advertising budget. This allows us to compare the results
to a random advertising strategy targeting the same number of consumers.
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Second, we investigate whether firms can learn to decrease their advertising
expenses, i.e., to minimize their costs. We use different genetic operators
to update the strategy base in each scenario. These GA operators are de-
scribed below.
6.3.3 The genetic algorithm used by the firms
Strategies are updated by a genetic algorithm. A strategy is represented
by a bitstring of length l, where, in this case, l is the number of consumers
in the network. If the ith bit on the chromosome equals 1 this means that
the strategy represented by the chromosome targets consumer i (if the bit
equals 0 the consumer is not targeted). We use a simple genetic algorithm to
update the strategies for the consumers. Since we consider consumers with
a fixed budget however, we use adapted mutation and crossover operators
(see below) in order to ensure that a strategy targets exactly m consumers,
where:
m =
[
Budget b
Marginal cost of advertising c
]
The fitness of a strategy is determined solely by the sales after t timesteps,
where t is the training time. The trainingtime t was taken between 10
and 50 timesteps. We have adapted the crossover and the mutation oper-
ator in order to ensure that a chromosome contains exactly m ones. Each
chromosome thus consists of l bits representing the consumers, m of those
bits are set to 1 and we will call thos bits the 1-bits, similarly, 0-bits are
the l −m bits that are set to 0. The algorithms for the adapted operators
are given below, which we call one-preserving mutation and one-preserving
crossover respectively.
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One-preserving mutation:
For each chromosome that is selected for mutation:
1. Randomly select one of the 1-bits
(one of the currently targeted consumers)
2. Change this bit to 0
3. Randomly select one of the old 0-bits
4. Change this bit to 1
One-preserving crossover:
For two parent chromosomes (parent1 and parent2) we create
two offspring chromosomes (offspring1 and offspring2):
0. Set all offspring bits to zero.
First we consider the k 1-bits that the two parents have in common
1. (Both strategies agree on those 1-bits)
These k 1-bits are copied onto the offspring chromosomes
(as would be the case with a regular crossover operator)
Second we consider the m− k remaining 1-bits
2. Select a random number Ccross between [0..m− k − 1]
Ccross is the crossover counter
3. Copy the first Ccross 1-bits from parent1 to offspring1
Copy the remaining bits from parent1 to offspring2
4. Copy the first Ccross 1-bits from parent2 to offspring2
Copy the remaining bits from parent2 to offspring1
In words, one-preserving mutation replaces a currently targeted consumer
and replaces it by a consumer that is currently not targeted. Note that
one-preserving mutation thus works on the entire chromosome, instead of
on a single bit. An example illustrating both operators is given in Figure 6.3
for a chromosome of length 6. The first parent chromosome thus specifies
that consumers 1, 3 and 5 receive targeted advertising (for example in the
form of a free sample product).
6.3.4 The social network
We investigate three types of social network architectures; the k-regular
network where all consumers have exactly k neighbors. In this chapter
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Parent 1:
Parent 2:
1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
One−preserving
Crossover
C = 1cross
One−preserving
1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0
Offspring 1:
Offspring 2:
1 0 0 0 1 1
Mutation
Parent: Offspring: 1 1 0 0 0 1
Figure 6.3: Example of one-preserving crossover and mutation
we restrict ourselves to regular networks that are modeled as a (one dimen-
sional) ring lattice where each agent is connected to its k nearest neighbours
by undirected edges. The random network, where links between consumers
are constructed randomly, and the Small World network. A Small World
network is constructed by taking a regular network and then rewiring a
small fraction of the links (usually between 1 and 10 percent of all links
(Watts and Strogatz 1998). This fraction of links is called the rewiring
constant (rc). The degree of a network is defined as the (average) num-
ber of neighbors of a given consumer in the network. For k-regular networks
the degree thus correpsonds to k. For Small World and random networks,
the number of links per consumer may vary and the degree of such networks
describes the average number of neighbours of a consumer.
In this chapter we consider a social network of 1000 consumers. This is
sufficiently large to observe the dynamics that occur for different network
topologies (Cowan and Jonard 2004). A cascade on the network occurs
if, starting from a small fraction of the consumers (the initially targeted
consumers), the diffusion spreads out to a large part of the population. In
this chapter, we define a cascade as a diffusion that reaches at least 80
percent of all consumers, starting from a small initial number of targeted
consumers. When the diffusion reaches all consumers in the network we call
this a global cascade. Note that such a global cascade may not always be
possible since random and Small World networks can be disconnected (see
Section 1.2.1).
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6.3.5 Diffusion dynamics
Diffusion dynamics are driven by the topology of the network, the adver-
tising strategy that is used by the firms and the consumer characteristics.
At each timestep in the model, the agent actions described above are ex-
ecuted resulting in the model cycle described below. Initially, the number
of consumers as well as their characteristics, the network topology and the
advertising strategy used by the firm are exogeneously given. The outcome
of the agent-based simulations now depends on those initial conditions and
the agent interactions.
Each cycle:
1. Firms choose an advertising strategy
(from their strategy base)
2. Consumers who have already bought the product
talk about the product to their neighbors
3. Consumers decide whether to (still) adopt the product
Go to 2. (Repeat for a given number of timesteps)
4. Firms calculate their profits
5. Firms update their strategies for the next period
We are especially interested in two aspects of the diffusion dynamics: (1)
the size of the diffusion, that is how many consumers eventually adopt the
innovation, and (2) the speed of the diffusion, that is, how long it takes to
reach this diffusion level. An important measure in assessing the properties
of the diffusion is the critical diffusion threshold. The critical diffusion
threshold in a network of homogeneous consumers is the highest exposure
threshold for which a cascade is observed. All thresholds below this critical
threshold will lead to cascades on the network.
6.4 Experimental setup
The goal of the experiments is to investigate whether firms can learn directed
advertising strategies to increase the diffusion of their products. Further-
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more, we want to investigate the properties of such strategies. The social
network and the consumer thresholds are exogeneously given at the start
of the simulation. We vary the topology of the network, with respect to
degree and network architecture, as well as the exposure thresholds of the
consumers, and study the diffusion process over time. We thus perform an
agent-based computational study of the diffusion of an innovation over a
social network. The diffusion dynamics are a result of the local interactions
of autonomous agents over time. The model described above allows us to
investigate the speed and the size of the innovation diffusion under different
initial conditions. Figure 6.1 gives an overview of the parameter values that
were used in the simulations.
Parameter Value
Number of Consumers 1000
Degree 1-20
Rewiring Constant (rc) 0.05
(Small World Network)
Exposure Threshold 0.0-0.5
Number of Initially 10
Targeted Consumers
Diffusion Time 10-50
(during learning)
Generations 20
Number of Strategies 50
Pone-mut 0.1
Pone-cross 1.0
Table 6.1: Parameter values used in the simulations.
6.5 Results and discussion
In this section we present the results of our simulations and compare the
diffusion processes under random and directed (learned) advertising.
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6.5.1 Homogeneous consumers
In this section we consider the diffusion of information over the network
when consumers are homogeneous with respect to their exposure thresh-
old. Figure 6.4 shows critical diffusion thresholds for the different types of
networks when consumers are homogeneous with respect to their exposure
thresholds and firms have a fixed budget. Each network consists of 1000
consumers. The degree of the network specifies the (average) number of
neighbors each consumer has. Points signify the maximum threshold for
which an informational cascade was achieved after 1000 timesteps starting
from 10 nodes. The averages are over 20 runs that is 20 different initial
networks were tested. The consumers that are initially targeted are differ-
ent in each run. The learning time is 50 timesteps. In the fixed budget
experiments we use the one-preserving operators discussed in the previous
section. Note that under these conditions the advertising strategy only has
to be optimized with regard to the network topology. If we look at Fig-
ure 6.4 we see that firms are able to learn effective advertising strategies.
In the case of the regular networks such a strategy has to target consumers
that are evenly spread out over the network in order to ensure maximum
diffusion. Using such a strategy, firms are able to achieve informational
cascades even if consumers have a low tendency to buy the product (i.e., a
high exposure threshold).
If we restrict our attention to the random strategies, we can observe
two different regimes; an upper phase for dense networks, a lower phase for
sparse networks. In a sparse network, diffusion of information is limited by
the global degree of the network, but cascades occur even when consumers
are quite ‘resistant’ to being convinced by their neighbors, i.e. when their
exposure threshold is high. On the other hand, if the network is sufficiently
dense, the propagation is limited by the stability of individual nodes. In
this case the critical exposure threshold is significantly smaller. Most nodes
have a large number of neighbors, but with a random strategy it is unlikely
that all these neighbors are buying the product at time 1, so the initial per-
turbation may not be able to diffuse at all. Note that critical thresholds are
similar for small-world and regular networks. We can observe that there are
no cascades on the random network for low degree, this is caused by the fact
118 Diffusion of information on a social network
2 4 6 8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
2 4 6 8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(Average) Degree of the Network
Cr
itic
al
 E
xp
os
ur
e 
Th
re
sh
ol
d
Informational Cascades − Directed versus Random Advertising
Learned Strategies
Random Advertising
Regular Networks 
Small World Networks 
Random Networks 
Figure 6.4: Critical diffusion thresholds for the different types of networks. Points sig-
nify the maximum threshold for which an informational cascade was achieved after 1000
timesteps starting from 10 nodes. (Averages over 20 runs). The learning time is 50
timesteps.
that the network may not be connected and the diffusion cannot reach all the
components of the network. Notice that as the degree increases, it becomes
more difficult for a cascade to occur. That is, cascades are only observed in
networks where the agents have a low exposure threshold. In a network of
degree 2, only one neighbor needs to purchase the product in order to start
the cascade, so a threshold of 0.5 is immediately obtained. Starting from
one initial consumer it becomes much more unlikely that a large fraction of
neighbors has bought the good if the degree is high. Furthermore, we also
observed cascades for some runs above the critical threshold. Figure 6.4
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shows that in order for a cascade to occur it is necessary that the network is
connected, that is that there are not too many components. Furthermore,
we see that as long as the network is connected, a cascade spreads more
easily over less regular networks. This is in accordance with the literature,
for example, Watts (2002).
With directed advertising however, this effect disappears and cascades
are achieved most often on regular networks. This can be explained by
the fact that on a regular network, firms only have to take into account the
position of a consumer in the network. In small world networks and random
networks however, not only the position of the consumer is important, but
also the number of links a consumer has as well as the type of links (cross-
network or only to close neighbors). Summarizing, we can say that firms
are able to learn effective directed advertising strategies in a network with
homogeneous consumers. Using these strategies, cascades can be achieved
in situations where random strategies only lead to limited diffusion. In the
next section we consider networks of heterogeneous consumers.
6.5.2 Heterogeneous consumers
In this section we consider the diffusion of information over the static net-
work when consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their exposure
threshold. Figure 6.5 shows the difference between random and directed
advertising when consumer exposure thresholds are drawn from a normal
N(0.3,0.1) distribution. Each point in the graph represents the average dif-
fusion after 50 runs of 1000 timesteps. In each run, a different consumer
network was generated.
Note that the learned strategies outperform the random advertising strate-
gies with respect to the size of the maximum diffusion. If we look at Fig-
ure 6.6 we also notice that (1) directed advertising strategies are able to
achieve cascades when the random strategies are not, (2) the size of the
diffusion is larger for directed advertising strategies (even if no cascade is
achieved), and (3) the speed of the diffusion is larger for directed advertising
strategies.
120 Diffusion of information on a social network
0 5 10 15 20
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0 5 10 15 20
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0 5 10 15 20
0
200
400
600
800
1000
(Average) Degree of the network
N
um
be
r o
f C
on
su
m
er
s 
th
at
 h
av
e 
ad
op
te
d 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
t 
a
fte
r 1
00
0 
st
ep
s
Directed versus Random Advertising:
Size of the diffusion as a function of the degree of the network
Learned Strategies
Random Advertising
Regular Networks Small World Networks 
Random Networks 
Figure 6.5: Directed and Random advertising when consumers are heterogeneous: Diffu-
sion versus network degree for different types of networks. Each datapoint represents the
average over 50 runs. The learning time is 50 timesteps.
6.5.3 Dynamics
To gain more insight in the nature of the directed advertising strategies, Fig-
ure 6.7 shows three evolved strategies for a smaller network. We see evolved
strategies for three types of networks, with twelve heterogeneous consumers
and an average degree of three. The experiments were conducted for a
budget of 4. The numbers at the nodes represent the exposure thresholds
of the consumers. Black nodes are targeted by the evolved strategies. All
three strategies lead to a cascade within 10 timesteps. As we examine the
evolved strategies more closely, we notice several interesting features. First,
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Figure 6.6: Directed versus Random advertising when consumers are heterogeneous: Dif-
fusion as a function of time for different types of networks.
the firms target consumers with a high exposure threshold (that is, the most
conservative consumers). Second they target consumers with a high number
of neighbors, and third they target isolated consumers (these consumers can
otherwise never be reached by the cascade). Furthermore, we notice that
in the case of the Small World network, both nodes that have a “rewired”
link are targeted, ensuring short pathlength for the diffusion. In the case
of random networks, the disconnected nodes (or components) have to be
targeted individually.
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6.5.4 Introducing negative externalities
This section describes the network dynamics when negative as well as posi-
tive externalities are present in the model. We consider two scenarios. In the
first scenario we assume that the attractiveness of the product depends on
the number of other consumers that have adopted it. A consumer decides
to adopt the product if this number exceeds its exposure threshold, but
discontinues using the product if its over-exposure threshold is exceeded.
However, once the number of other users decreases, the user may decide to
use the product again. In the second scenario, a consumer never returns to
the product once he has abandoned it. This may model a situation where
the consumers abandon a fashion or fad and move on to the next hip thing.
Scenario 1: Figure 6.8 shows results for heterogeneous agents when
negative externalities are also present. In these experiments, the exposure
threshold et is drawn from uniform[0,0.5]. The exposure threshold and the
over-exposure threshold et and oet are correlated, namely oet = et + 0.5.
This reflects the fact that the innovators may also be the first consumers who
abandon the product if the next innovation reaches the market or if they do
no longer consider the item fashionable if too many consumers are using it.
Again, we have used a network of 1000 consumers and look at the size of the
diffusion after 100 periods (the size of the diffusion remained constant if we
consider 1000 timesteps). First, we note that the learned strategy performs
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much better than the random strategy in regular networks. This can be
explained by looking at the path of the diffusion. In networks with high
clustering (such as regular networks and small world networks with a low
rewiring constant) the diffusion progresses from neighbor to neighbor. But
since in such networks most neighbors of one consumer are also neighbors of
each other, the over-exposure threshold is reached sooner than in networks
with low clustering.
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Figure 6.8: Diffusion of the product when negative as well as positive externalities are
present. Averages over 20 runs.
This explains why the average size of the diffusion is lower in regular net-
works than for less clustered networks. Table 6.2 gives the average size of
the diffusion for the different types of networks. Figure 6.9 shows a typical
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Network Topology Average size of the diffusion
Learned/Random Strategy
Regular Networks 535/337
Small World Networks 623/610
Random Networks 589/586
Table 6.2: Average number of consumers that have adopted the innovation, when negative
externalities are present, averaged over 20 runs and taken over timestep 100–1000.
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Figure 6.9: Diffusion of the product in a small world network when negative as well as
positive externalities are present. Two typical runs.
run for a Small-World Network. Note that the average size of the diffusion
is a little higher for the learned strategy. The oscillating behaviour is caused
by a small group of consumers that continually switches between using and
not using the product. If we look at the second scenario we see that this
behaviour disappears.
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Scenario 2: Under this scenario, the negative externality has a perma-
nent effect and a consumer who decides to discontinue using the product
will never resume using it. Figure 6.10 gives results for different types of
networks under these conditions. First, we notice that the fluctuating be-
haviour disappears. Furthermore, we can observe that the total size of the
diffusion is smaller than in the first scenario. This is caused by the fact that
the diffusion dies off because of the negative externality, before all potential
consumers have been reached. This effect is stronger for the more regular
networks than for the random network. Moreover, the effect of learning
is also much clearer for the regular and the small world network. This is
caused by the fact that the diffusion goes very fast in random networks.
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Figure 6.10: Diffusion patterns when negative externalities are present: scenario 2.
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6.6 Conclusions
This chapter investigated the spread of information on a social network.
The network consists of agents that are exposed to the introduction of a
new product. Consumers decide whether or not to buy the product based
on their own preferences and the decisions of their neighbors in the social
network. We have used and extended concepts from the literature on epi-
demics and herd behavior to study this problem. The central question of
this chapter is whether firms can learn about the network structure and
consumer characteristics when only limited information is available, and
use this information to evolve a successful directed advertising strategy. In
order to do so, we have extended existing models to allow for heterogeneous
agents and positive as well as negative externalities. The firm can learn a
directed advertising strategy that takes into account both the topology of
the social consumer network and the characteristics of the consumer. Such
directed advertising strategies outperform random advertising.
Chapter 7
Concluding remarks
Evolutionary agent-based economics differs from traditional economics in
two important aspects. Agents are boundedly rational instead of perfectly
rational and interaction is not global and not anonymous. These two factors
form the basis of this thesis and in the previous chapters we have studied
the effects of incorporating bounded rationality as well as different forms of
interaction on economic model outcomes.
We have shown that different types of interaction between agents can
have a great impact on the outcomes of the economic game or model under
investigation. We have modeled several local interaction mechanisms and
structures that are observed in the real world. Using these forms of inter-
action, outcomes that are different from economic theory but that do occur
in the real world were observed. Furthermore, our simulations have shown
that the level of rationality of the agents also has a great influence on the
outcomes of the model under investigation. Boundedly rational agents often
achieve outcomes that differ from the outcomes predicted by economic the-
ory but that are observed in the real world (i.e., collusion or cooperation).
In this way agent-based simulations can help us to close the gap between
theory and the real world.
Evolutionary agent-based economics allows us to study the emerging
outcomes from micro-level behavior in large systems of interacting agents.
Furthermore, this technique makes it possible to relax some of the restrictive
assumptions made in economic theory. Agent-based simulations are thus a
useful and necessary addition to game theoretic models in the study of sys-
tems of interacting intelligent agents. Evolutionary game theoretic models
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study such systems through mathematical analysis and have given us many
useful insights. However, in order for these models to remain analytically
tractable, agent behavior is oversimplified and assumptions are often far
from realistic. Advances in computing, in both hardware and algorithms,
enable us to study economic models and games through simulations. Such
simulations are particularly suitable to study how agents learn from past
experience and from each other, and how such learning processes lead to
change and dynamic emergent behavior at the aggregate level. Furthermore,
it allows us to further investigate systems where path-dependency plays an
important role, that is systems where small differences in the initial con-
ditions or the interaction patterns between agents can lead to significant
changes in outcomes. Using evolutionary algorithms to model agent learn-
ing behavior makes it possible to study heterogeneous agents with a wide
variety of (innovative) learned strategies. We thus use evolutionary algo-
rithms to evolve good agent strategies based on the Darwinian principle of
‘survival of the fittest’. We have shown that the evolutionary agent-based
economics approach allows us to both study extensions of existing models
and gain insight in the dynamics of newly arising market structures.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that it in order to draw valid conclu-
sions from evolutionary agent-based economics models, the modeler should
take several modeling and methodological issues into account. First, sim-
ulation results must always be compared to a benchmark model in order
to be able to interpret these results. In this thesis the benchmark model
used is the existing economic theory. Simulation models can be validated
by comparing outcomes in standard cases with theoretical outcomes, and
known outcomes form a benchmark for the outcomes of new simulations
with less restrictive assumptions. The second important issue is how the
parameters of the computational intelligence technique relate to the learning
behavior of the agents. Modelers have to distinguish technical parameters
from learning parameters. Furthermore, simulation results should be robust
to small changes in the technical parameter settings. If these guidelines are
followed, agent-based evolutionary economics makes it possible to study a
wide variety of previously unstudied models and phenomena.
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Summary
Evolutionary agent-based economics differs from traditional economics in
two important aspects. First, agents are boundedly rational instead of per-
fectly rational and second, the interaction between agents is not global and
not anonymous. These two factors form the basis of this thesis and we aim
to include these aspects in our models. First by investigating the behav-
ior of boundedly rational agents and the effects of interacting structure in
existing economic models, and then by addressing new models concerning
internet markets and information goods. Chapter 1 contains the introduc-
tion of the thesis and presents the most important concepts and methods
used in the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the proper design and implementation of
evolutionary economic simulations. Agent-based computational economics
(ACE) combines elements from economics and computer science. In this
chapter, we focus on the relation between the evolutionary techniques that
are used and the economic problem that is modeled. Current economic sim-
ulations often derive parameter settings for the genetic algorithm directly
from the values of the economic model parameters. In this chapter we show
that this practice may hinder the performance of the GA and thereby hinder
agent learning. More specifically, we show that economic model parame-
ters and evolutionary algorithm parameters should be treated separately by
comparing two widely used approaches to population learning with respect
to their convergence properties and robustness.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the Cournot model. In this chapter we
present an individual learning model which allows us to compare different
types of agents with different levels of rationality that are interacting in
the market. A Cournot duopoly market modeled as a co-evolving system
of autonomous interacting agents is investigated. We present results for
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different types of boundedly rational agents. Agent types differ in both
the complexity of their strategies and the information they have available
to make their decision. Some types of agents use very simple strategies
to make a production decision, while other types use a quite sophisticated
decision rule. All agents types are tested in a round robin tournament. We
consider the evolutionary stability of the evolving populations, especially
with respect to the different equilibria of the Cournot game. Furthermore,
we investigate the performance of the different agent types under changing
market conditions.
In Chapter 4 we return to a population learning model but the focus
of this chapter is on the structure of the interaction and the influence of
the recombination operator on the outcomes of the simulation. The evo-
lution of cooperation in a system of agents playing the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma (IPD) is investigated. We present results for the standard two-
person IPD as well as the more general N-person IPD (NIPD) game. In
our computational model, agents have visible tags and choose whether to
interact or not based upon these tags. We consider the evolutionary stabil-
ity of the evolving populations. We extend previous work by introducing
sexual reproduction (recombination) of strategies and by analyzing its in-
fluence on the evolving populations. We observe the occasional formation
of very stable cooperative societies, as opposed to previous results without
sexual reproduction. These cooperative societies are able to resist invasions
of “mimics” (defecting agents with the tag of a cooperating agent).
Chapter 5 builds on the techniques presented in the previous chapters to
address the question whether intermediaries will still exist and be able to
make a profit if consumers can make direct connections with producers, as is
often the case in electronic commerce. We have performed agent-based sim-
ulations to study the performance of intermediaries under different market
conditions. We modeled an electronic trade network where an information
good is traded over the network. Each trade period, cost-minimizing con-
sumers have to decide which links to form to sellers (i.e., producers and
intermediaries), while the good can only be purchased if a link between the
buyer and the seller exists. Links thus represent trading possibilities, and
flows of relevant information (i.e., in our case, price quotes between poten-
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tial buyers and sellers) and the consumers have to make a strategic decision
about which (costly) links to form. We have used an evolutionary algorithm
to model the search and learning behavior of the buyers. Our main finding
is that if market dynamics are sufficiently complex, intermediaries that have
better knowledge about the market than the average consumer are initially
able to increase their market share and make a profit.
Chapter 6 investigates the spread of information on a social network.
The network consists of agents that are exposed to the introduction of a
new product. Consumers decide whether or not to buy the product based
on their own preferences and the decisions of their neighbors in the social
network. We have used and extended concepts from the literature on epi-
demics and herd behavior to study this problem. The central question of
this chapter is whether firms can learn about the network structure and
consumer characteristics when only limited information is available, and
use this information to evolve a successful directed advertising strategy. In
order to do so, we have extended existing models to allow for heterogeneous
agents and positive as well as negative externalities. The firm can learn a
directed advertising strategy that takes into account both the topology of
the social consumer network and the characteristics of the consumer. Such
directed advertising strategies outperform random advertising. Concluding
remarks are given in Chapter 7.
Samenvatting
Evolutionary agent-based economics verschilt van de klassieke economische
aanpak in twee belangrijke opzichten. Ten eerste zijn de agenten (of actoren)
begrensd wat betreft hun rationaliteit, in plaats van volledig rationeel zoals
vaak wordt aangenomen in de economische literatuur. Ten tweede is de
interactie tussen de agenten niet globaal maar lokaal gespecificeerd, ook
dit in tegenstelling tot wat we in de economische theorie vaak tegenkomen.
Deze twee principes, begrensde rationaliteit en lokale interactie, vormen de
basis van dit proefschrift. In de afzonderlijke hoofdstukken integreren we
deze principes stap voor stap in economische modellen en bestuderen we
de gevolgen hiervan. Allereerst bekijken we het gedrag van agenten met
beperkte rationaliteit in bekende economische modellen. Dit geeft ons de
mogelijkheid de uitkomsten goed te vergelijken met theoretische uitkomsten.
Vervolgens richten we ons op modellen van internetmarkten en markten
waar informatiegoederen verhandeld worden. Dit type markten is vrij recent
en simulatietechnieken helpen om inzicht te krijgen in de dynamiek van deze
markten. Hieronder geven we een meer gedetailleerde beschrijving van de
verschillende hoofdstukken.
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat de introductie tot het proefschrift en behandelt de
belangrijkste begrippen.
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt verschillende aspecten van het modelleren en im-
plementeren van evolutionaire economische simulaties. Agent-based com-
putational economics is een interdisciplinair vakgebied op het gebied tussen
de economie, psychologie en de informatica. In dit hoofdstuk houden we
ons bezig met het onderscheid tussen de gebruikte evolutionaire techniek en
het economische probleem dat onderzocht wordt. Veel onderzoekers nemen
de keuzen voor de waarden van de parameters van het genetisch algoritme
direct over uit het economische model. In dit hoofdstuk tonen we aan dat
144 Samenvatting
deze handelswijze de werking van het genetisch algoritme en daardoor het
leren van de agenten negatief kan be¨ınvloeden. We doen dit door twee veel-
gebruikte ontwerpmethoden te vergelijken. We pleiten ervoor dat de mo-
delbouwer de economische parameters en de parameters van het genetisch
algoritme afzonderlijk behandelt. De richtlijnen voor het modelleren van
evolutionaire simulaties die in dit hoofdstuk gegeven worden, functioneren
als de basis voor de modellen in volgende hoofdstukken.
In hoofdstuk 3 bestuderen we het Cournot model. Hier gebruiken we
een model voor individueel leren dat ons in staat stelt verschillende typen
beperkt rationele agenten te vergelijken. We bekijken een Cournot duopolie
markt waar de verschillende typen agenten elkaar tegenkomen. In dit type
markt wordt de beste strategie mede bepaald door de beslissingen van de
andere agent. Agenten verschillen zowel wat betreft de complexiteit van
hun strategiee¨n als wat betreft de beschikbare informatie op basis waarvan
een beslissing moet worden gemaakt. Sommige typen agenten gebruiken
hele eenvoudige strategiee¨n om tot een produktiebeslissing te komen terwijl
andere agenten meer complexe en verfijnde beslisregels gebruiken. We testen
het succes van de verschillende typen door middel van marktsimulaties. De
nadruk ligt hierbij op de stabiliteit van de evoluerende populaties rondom
de mogelijke marktevenwichten. Ten tweede bestuderen we het gedrag van
de agenten wanneer de marktcondities veranderen en dus een voortdurende
aanpassing van de strategie vereist is.
In hoofdstuk 4 bekijken we de effecten van selectieve interactie. Bij se-
lectieve interactie is de interactie tussen agenten niet globaal en anoniem
zoals we in de theorie zien maar hebben agenten een voorkeur voor interac-
tie met bepaalde andere agenten. We bestuderen dit door middel van het
bekende herhaalde prisoner’s dilemma spel, een veelgebruikt model voor de
evolutie van samenwerking in situaties waarin het op de korte termijn juist
lonend is om niet coo¨peratief te handelen. Naast een strategie voor het spel
beschikken alle agenten ook over een zogenaamde tag, een label. We bestu-
deren of de agenten kunnen leren om bepaald gedrag met bepaalde tags te
associe¨ren om zo de coo¨peratie te bevorderen. De strategiee¨n evolueren met
behulp van een genetisch algoritme. We breiden eerder werk op dit gebied
uit door niet alleen naar genetische algoritmen met selectie en mutatie, maar
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ook naar genetische algoritmen met reproductie (crossover) te kijken. De
resultaten laten zien dat in tegenstelling tot bij asexuele genetische algorit-
men, er stabiele coo¨peratieve (sub)populaties onstaan wanneer recombinatie
wordt gebruikt. Deze stabiele populaties zijn in staat coo¨peratie in stand
te houden en invasies van mimics (agenten met een coo¨peratieve tag maar
niet-coo¨peratief gedrag) te weerstaan. Deze mimics zorgden er in eerdere
experimenten voor dat de coo¨peratie steeds opnieuw teniet werd gedaan.
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op de vraag of intermediairs (tussenpersonen)
kunnen blijven bestaan en winst kunnen maken in een markt waar de con-
sumenten ook direct zaken kunnen doen met de producenten zoals vaak
het geval is bij electronic commerce (handel over het internet). We bestu-
deren de prestaties van de tussenpersonen onder verschillende marktcon-
dities door middel van simulaties met agenten. We bestuderen de handel
in een informatiegoed over een electronisch (handels) netwerk. De kopers
(consumenten, tussenpersonen) moeten beslissen met welke aanbieders (pro-
ducenten dan wel tussenpersonen) ze een verbinding willen onderhouden;
wat kosten met zich mee brengt. Er vindt alleen handel plaats als er een
verbinding bestaat tussen een aanbieder en een koper. Verbindingen zijn
dus handelsmogelijkheden, oftewel een uitwisseling van relevante informatie
en kopers moeten een strategische keuze maken welke links te vormen. Ook
hier gebruiken we een genetisch algoritme om het leergedrag van de agenten
te simuleren. De belangrijkste conclusie uit dit hoofdstuk is dat tussen-
personen met expert-kennis over de markt in staat zijn om een substantieel
marktaandeel te verwerven in snel-veranderende markten en winst te maken.
In hoofdstuk 6 onderzoeken we hoe informatie zich verspreidt over een
sociaal netwerk. De agenten in het sociale netwerk krijgen te maken met de
introductie van een nieuw product op de markt. Bij de beslissing om het
nieuwe product al dan niet te kopen spelen niet alleen de preferenties van de
agent zelf een rol, maar ook de beslissingen van zijn buren in het netwerk.
Het gaat hier dus om goederen waarbij de waarde van het goed mede wordt
bepaald door de mening van andere agenten, zogenaamede mode of hype
goederen. We gebruiken concepten uit de literatuur over het verspreiden
van epidemiee¨n en over kuddegedrag bij consumenten als uitgangspunten
voor ons model. De belangrijkste vraag hier is of een verkoper die slechts
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over geaggregeerde verkoopdata beschikt kan leren om gebruik te maken van
de karaketeristieken van het sociale netwerk om tot een hogere marktpene-
tratie te komen. Deze verkopers leren dan een gerichte advertentiestrategie
die slechts die consumenten benadert die een snelle verspreiding van het
product garanderen. We bestuderen dit probleem door middel van simu-
laties met agenten en de producent leert marketingstrategiee¨n door middel
van een genetisch algoritme. Onze experimenten laten zien dat producen-
ten inderdaad strategiee¨n kunnen leren die op een efficie¨nte wijze gebruik
maken van de structuur van het netwerk en de karakteristieken van de in-
dividuele consumenten. Zulke strategiee¨n leiden tot een voordeel voor de
producenten.
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